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PREFACE
Althou^ Ccranunlsm has captured the attention of many historians.
It did not receive sufficient attention in Latin American studies unitl 
Fidel Castro brou^t the Cannunist ideology into power in Cuba. The 
Cold War opened a new front so close to the United States that Ameri­
cans were forced to re-evaluate their position in Latin America. Actu­
ally, the Cold War polemic hit Latin America long before Castro declared 
himself a Communist. Those nations below the Rfo Grande faced the di- 
lenina of trying to develop industrially without compromising their 
sovereignty to obtain the foreign capital necessary for development.
If it appeared that a Latin American government gave too many conces­
sions to obtain aid from the United States, the Conmunists appealed to 
the strong sense of nationalism in Latin America. At the same time,
Latin American governments had to consider popular demands for a higher 
standard of living. To encourage the investment of foreign capital 
needed for development, some concessions became necessary. Latin Ameri­
can governments strove for a balance between economic necessity and 
sovereignty. Pressure from foreign capitalists and Ccmnunists made that 
position difficult to maintain. In order to obtain desired influence, 
both the IMited States and the Soviet Union had to determine how far 
they could go in pushing their respective interests without violating 
nation^ pride in Latin America.
Mexico during the 1920's served as an ideal example of the potential
ii
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conflict between economic and nationalistic goals. In that period 
Mexico’s new revolutionary government encountered severe opposition 
from United States capitalists and Communists of both the foreign and 
doemstic brands. While trying to diminish the United States strong 
economic a M  political influence, the Mexican government defended Mexi­
can sovereignty from the machinations of Communists working under 
directives from Moscow. The Mexicans were willing to take United States 
capital if it could be obtained without sacrificing sovereignty. They 
were not willing to accept a foreign ideology such as Communism vSien 
they had fought so hard to establish a national creed under the Mexican 
Consitution of 1917, the fruit of a bloody revolution that began in 
1910.
Other authors have studied the conflict between Communism and Mexi­
can nationalism to show cause for the Ccmmunist failure in Mexico dur­
ing the 1920's. In the process, they usually touch upon the effect 
Communism had on Mexican-United States relations. What Ijrpact did 
Communism and anti-Communist saitiment have on the ties between the two 
countries? Communism and anti-Comnunist sentiment had such an impor­
tant effect on IMited States-Mexican relations between 1919 and 1930 
that they merit a separate analysis. Those years saw the beginning 
of the Third Ccmmunist International CCcminterm), attempts by that body 
to infiltrate Latin America and specifically Mexico, and the renascent 
nationalism of a Mexican nation at the apogee of revolutionary fervor.
As it corresponded to the ’Red Scare' era in the United States, this 
period offers much information on Conmunist activity in Mexico and the 
influence that particular ideology may have had on the Mexican govem-
iii
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ment and the United States State Departoient. This paper will attempt 
to trace the inpact of the Red Scare on diplomatic and économie inter­
course between Mexico and the United States in that period.
Pears held by the State Department and the reactive, overly sensi­
tive nationalism of Mexico’s revolutionary regimes in the 1920’s hin­
dered the restoration of amiable relations. As a consequence, mistrust 
and suspicion remained a constant in the relations between the two 
nations. The intrusion of Comintern agents probably hindered the 
resumption of haimonious diplomatic and commerical intercourse between 
Mexico and the United States.
After establishing the stroigth of Ccranunism in Mexico, it is 
possible to discuss American charges against Mexican radicalism, charges 
that may have confused Canraunism and indigenous Mexican nationalist 
ideology. This study shall focus can those charges as they affected 
Mexican-United States affairs. Officials in the United States generally 
exaggerated Ccmmunist strength in Mexico during the 1920’s. At the 
same time, Ccmmunist officials misinterpreted the Mexican Revolution 
much as the capitalists did. In the long run the United States bene­
fited by changing its hostile attitude toward the Mexican Revoluticn 
and dropping its allegations of Ccranunist ccaitrol in Mexico. The Commu­
nists, by trying to push their own political ideas, destroyed diplo­
matic channels that may have left them with greater influence in Mexico. 
The United States government learned frcm a decade of near disaster 
that respect for Mexican sovereignty accaiplished more than diplomacy 
by threat. United States charges against alleged Communist control in 
Mexico, however, had enormous potential for bringing the United States
iv
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and Mexico into an amed conflict In the decade of the first 'Red Scare’ 
in the United States. Who used those allegations? Toward what ends 
did they use them? How valid were the charges? What were the impli­
cations? Ihe paper will attarpt to answer those questions.
The scope of this study was severly limited by the availability 
of sources. The National Archives’ microfilm series on State Department 
reports on Internal affairs of Mexico and diplomatic dispatches on 
United States-Mexican relations filled in much of the background. The 
New York Times gave much detail not to be found elseviiere. The news­
paper r^orted Mexican-United States relations quite conprehenslvely and 
gave special attention to the influoice of Communism in Mexico. One 
could practically trace the importance of the ’Red Scare’ In Mexican- 
United States relations following the pages of The New York Times and 
noting the amount of coverage and location. Another particularly 
valuable source was International Press Correspondence Cinprecorr), the 
official publication of the Executive Committee of the Conmunist Inter­
national . Inprecorr allows one to gain Insist into the Comlntem’s 
policy while aiding with substantial information on the Mexican Commu­
nist Party. Inprecorr’s bias is usually so obvious that the careful 
researcher can sort the fact from the fiction without much problem.
It could usually be checked against other sources such as The New York 
Times. Mexican sources were especially hard to obtain. For official 
responses to charges of Bolshevism that came from the United States, 
Stephen Cllssold’s Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1918-1968; A 
Documentary Survey, was an Invaluable aid. Here again The New York 
Times carried most official Mexican reactions. Thou^ the sources were
V
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limited, they provided enough variation to conplete this short study 
v\M.le offering checks against each other. A more thorou^ study of the 
Mexican government's concern over Caimunlsm must wait until new mater­
ials are made available.
The secondary literature generally agrees that Mexican nationalism 
defeated Conmunlsm In Mexico. Arthur Whitaker and David Jordan's 
Nationalism In Contermjorary Latin America gave a general view of 
Communist failure in Latin America while Robert Freeman anlth's The 
United States and Revolutionary Nationalism In Mexico, 1916-1930 dealt 
in part with Communism's influence on Mexican relations with the United 
States. Robert Alexander's Communism In Latin America was perhaps the 
best source for a description of the Communist failure in Mexico. Ad­
ditional information but no new interpretation was offered by Rollle 
Popplno in International Communism in Latin America. Victor Alba 
covered much the same ground as Alexander and Popplno In his Politics 
and the Labor Movement in Latin America. He also agreed that Mexicans 
rejected Communism out of a desire to keep their movement a national 
one without foreign directions. Alba's concern, however, was with all 
types of radicalism as It related to the labor movonent and like the 
others neglected the role Ccmnunlsm had In Mexico's relations with the 
United States. Karl M. Schnltt's Conmunlsm In Mexico outlined the 
structure of the Communist Party In Mexico for the 1920 *s vdnlle under^ 
lining the Party's failure in that period. My study of Communism in 
United 8tates4üexlcan affairs could not have been conducted without much 
of the solid groundwork laid through the research of those authors 
mentioned above.
vl
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CHAPIER I
RADICALISM AND THE 1917 MEXICAN CONSTIŒUTION
The Mexican Revolution of 1910 initiated a tumultous upheaval that 
supporters justified with nationalistic tenus. Xenophobia constituted 
a basic part of that nationalism and was directed most specifically at 
the IMited States which had strengthened economic ties in the period 
of Mexican President Porfirio Diaz (1877-1911). Opposition to foreign 
investment and alleged exploitation fostered the background in which 
Mexicans adopted the Ccxistitution of 1917. Ihat document included 
several articles which appeared radical to the United States investors 
and Americans in general during the 1920's. United States reactions 
to the Constitution of 1917 analogized the Mexican Revolution with the 
spread of radicalism at home and abroad.
The violent Soviet takeover in Russia in 1917 further complicated 
the situation. Creating a "Red Scare" in the United States, the Russian 
Revolution helped to obscure the indigeneous developuent of the Mexican 
Constitution of 1917 and the true nature of Mexico's desire for social 
refom. Mexico's was a national revolution and not an elenent of an 
international one. The Mexicans would not foregt their Revolution began 
in 1910, and even their Constitution preceded the Russian revolt.
Neither would they forget that Russians were just as much foreigners as 
the Americans.
1
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To clarify why many could have seen the Mexican Revolution and the 
1917 Constitution as Connunistic and, therefore, part of an international 
plot, it is necessary to look at those allegedly radical segnents of 
the Ccnsjbltuticai and their development. Similarity did exist, but the 
Mexican Constitution could be justified by national circumstances invol­
ving economics, politics, and social conditions. Although not Imported 
frcm Russia, the Mexican revolutionary ideology did find seme European 
thought applicable to providing solutions for Mexican problens. Mexi­
can Constitution writers applied those ideas in their cwn ways and with­
out foreign guidance.
Whatever the origins of the 1917 Constitution, seme American inves­
tors with Mexican interests formed their own views in the context of 
events at the time. William P. Buckley, an American with extensive 
property interests in Mexico, presented his view of the radical nature 
of the 1917 Constitution when he appeared before the Senate Ccninittee 
investigating Mexican affairs in 1919. He stated the following:
The Carranza [Mexican President 1917-1920] leaders took 
every precaution in order that there might be no obstacle to 
putting through the program outlined in the ccnstituticn....
Thus has Carranza acconplished three of the great bolshevist 
objects of the revolution— the abolition of private property, . 
the crippling of the church, and the expulsion of the foreigner.
Buckley's coiment referred specifically to articles 3, 27, and 123. The
most significant of those Constituticxial provisions, as far as influencing
^United States Senate, Investigation of Mexican Affairs, Report 
and Hearing Before a Sub-Conmittee cm Foreign Relations, Senator Albert 
Bacon PallT Presiding, Pursuant to Senate Resolution loé. Senate Docu­
ment No. 2o5 (2 volsT, Washington, D. C., 1919-1920), p. 829• Hereafter 
reffered to as Fall Ccninittee.
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United States relations and fears of Comnunism, was Article 27. The 
following summary of that article was given in Survey of International 
Affairs in 1925.
The ownership of lands and waters in Mexico was vested in 
the nation which could and did transmit its title to private 
persons but under what limitations it pleased. Direct owner­
ship of all subsoil was vested in the nation. Only Mexican 
citizens might own land or obtain concessions to exploit the 
subsoil; or if foreigners received the same right they must 
agree to be considered Mexicans in respect of such property 
and not to invoke the protection of their government in respect 
of the same. Religious institutions had no power to acquire 
real property. All places of public worship were the property 
of the nation. The surface of the land was to be disposed of 
for the public good, expropriated owners receiving canopensation.
All measures passed since I856 alienating communal lands were 
to be null and void.2
This revolutionary article did not quite live up to Mr. Buckley’s 
claim that the intent was to abolish all private property. It is true, 
however, that the Mexican Government had a weapon in the clause "Private 
property shall not be expropriated except for cause of the public util­
ity and by means of indemnification.United States property owners in 
Mexico justifiably felt frightened by the implications of that statement.
United States oil and lard investors in Mexico also protested a 
section of Article 27 which called for revision and possible nullifica­
tion of "contracts and concessions made by former governments from and 
after the year 1876 vhich shall have resulted in the monopoly of lands, 
waters, and natural resources of the nation by a single individual or
In Robert Freeman Snith, The United States and Revolutionary 
Nationalism In Mexico, 1916-1923 CChicago, Illinoisel Chicago Univer­
sity Press, 1972), pp. 73-74. Cited hereafter as Smith, Revolutionary 
Nationalism. See Appendix for Article 27.
%"all Ccranittee, p. 3126.
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H
cca^joration."^ That clause was aimed at the period during which Porfirio 
Diaz ruled Mexico. It was also a period during vhlch Americans Invested 
heavily in Mexico by purchasing land and oil rights. Americans, inclu­
ding William F. Buckley, stood to lose a fortune in Mexico under Article 
27. %  1912 American investment in Mexico exceeded $1,500,000,000.^
Secretary of State Robert Lansing (1915-1920) championed the protec­
tion of United States economic interests in Mexico. It appeared in 1917 
that Carranza supported the Queretaro Convention’s decision on confisca­
tion under Article 27. Secretary Lansing stated that the "...American 
Government cannot acquiesce in any direct conflscaion of foreign-owned 
properties in Mexico or indirect confiscation."^ Although President 
Woodrow Wilson did not favor anned protection for American investors 
abroad, at least one other member of his cabinet agreed with Lansing’s 
hard line in dealing with Mexico. That was Secretary of the Interior 
Franklin K. Lane who wrote Lansing the following on December 1, 1919:
I wish somehow that you could be given a free hand in 
this matter. I know it would be a stiff hand, and that is 
what those people need. They are naughty children who are 
exercising all the privileges and rights of grown-4j.ps. They 
have the right of self--deterralnation, and that is self-will—  
nothing new. They are the creatures of all the mixed philo­
sophies of the past century— wilful children told by Jefferson 
that all men were b o m  equal, by Marx that private property is 
robbery, and by Wilson that each nation is a law unto itself.... 
They need... to be told where to get off.'
^Pall Committee, p. 3129.
^James Morton Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1932), p. 519.
^Fall Committee, p. 3122.
7Papers of the Department of State relating to Political Relatins 
with Mexico, Record Group 59, 711.12/224 1/2. Secretary Lane to Lansing, 
December 1, 1919. Hereafter cited as R. G. 59, 711.12/document number, author recipient date.
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Article 27 did have a tenuous tie with the philosophies mentioned 
by Secretary Lane, but it also represented a Mexican attempt to salve 
popular resentment in Mexico over too much land in too few hands. While 
most of the 1917 Constitution was merely a revised form of the 1857 Mexi­
can Constitution, Article 27 was one of those new, revolutionary articles. 
It was partially influenced by the ideas of the Mexican Liberal Party 
CPIM). While in exile for opposition to Porfirio Dfaz, the organizing 
Committee of the PLM issued a program on July 1, 1906. It denounced the 
hacienda system and declared in favor of land refom for the peasantry.
All of these suggestions were motivated by nationalism, but they also 
reflected the influence of the European socialist ideology which inspired
g
many PIM leaders.
Carranza later incorporated PLM ideas into his revolutionary decrees 
as a means for obtaining peasant and labor support. Land redistribution 
was a basic part of his decree of January 6, 1915» which remained law 
under the 1917 Constitution. Carranza, however, was not a socialist.
The radical elements of the 1917 Constitution were offered as a compromise 
with little intent to implement them except as popular pressure demanded. 
There had been only one Marxist at the Convention which drew up the Consti­
tution, and he had little influence with Carranza or the Queretaro Conven­
tion.^
®Prank E. Spencer, "Revolution and Article 27: A Survey of Nationa­
listic Conflict" (unpublished M.A. thesis. University of Montana, 1971), 
pp. 4-5.
ĝRollie E. Poppino, International Communism in Latin America: A
History of the Movement 1917—19^3 (London: Ihe Free Press of Glencoe,
1964), p. 51. The Marxist was Luis G. Monzon, a Sonoran school teacher. 
See James Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution, 
1900-1913 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968), passim, for nationa-
listic aspects of the PLM*s plans.
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Article 27's Section II forbade church ownership of real estate and 
made places of worship national property. Meant as a slap at the Catholic 
Church for its large holdings and secular involvement, the attack led 
many to assume it was part of an atheistic plot. When President Plutarco 
Elfas Called troubles with the Church erupted into open warfare in the 
1920’s, many claimed Ccranunist involvement and sought sympathy frcm United 
States Christians, especially the Catholics.
The attack on Church property in Article 27 followed Article 3’s 
removal of public instruction from the Church’s hands. In combination, 
the two articles placed seVfere restrictions on Church operations. The 
Mexican Government finally enforced those provisions, but not before a 
bloody struggle in the 1920’s and a compromise on the Church’s functions.
Labor agitation was another element of the 1920*s. The radical 
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) added to the fear of Bolshevism in 
the United States. Even less radical, reformist unions raised tensions 
as the masses of workers sought to unionize and to better conditions for 
the laborer. Mexico faced a similar surge of labor discontent in the 
same period. The Revolution anbodied that movement, and Article 123 of 
the Mexican Constitution of 1917 reflected the desire for labor reform. 
Advanced in comparison to United States labor reforms. Article 123 also 
looked like a concession to radicalism.
Howard P. Cline summed up Article 123 as follows;
... lit] enjoined on the state the fostering of a strong 
Pkxican labor movement and gave the state powers to regulate 
it. It recognized labor unions as ’moral persons’ with a long 
list of duties and responsibilities. It voiced the need for 
social security legislation and provided a set of Utopian 
norms for the conditions and remuneration of Mexican labor.
The basic principle of Article 123 was that labor was a status.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
a way of life, for which the minimum essentials were now 
constitutionally guaranteed, rather than an economic carmodity 
subject to the market vagaries of supply and demand.
When the Ccmnunists arrived in Mexico, the Mexican proletariat 
already had a symbol for their cause and a legal guarantee of their 
rights. Article 123 meant that the Mexican worker possessed a legal, 
national solution. He did not have to look for a foreign doctrine. To 
achieve satisfactory working conditions, the laborer only needed imple­
mentation of the 1917 Constitution. With a strong man government, espe­
cially that of 'First Chief' Carranza up to 1920, implementation proved 
an ideal to be attained rather than a reality already achieved.
A significant amount of labor agitation occured prior to the Quer^ 
taro Convention which ultimately adopted the 1917 Constitution. Some 
agitation continued throughout the 1920's and gave the Ccmraunlsts a 
following in Mexico, an arrangement the Ccmnunlst International actively 
sought. A diversity, however, appeared in the labor movenent from the 
very beginning in Mexico. It was a diversity that kept labor elements 
from dominating the Revolution. It also represented schisms so deep 
that the Communists were unable to bring about their desired massive 
proletarian uprising.
One of the first strong labor organizations in Mexico was the Casa 
del Obrero Mundial (H^use of the World Workers ). A number of smaller 
labor unions came together during the early stages of the Revolution vdien 
Francisco Madero was struggling to keep the reigns on the revolt he had 
initiated against Porfirio rfaz. In 1914 they joined General Alvaro
^%oward F. Cline, The United States and JVfexico (New York: Atheneum,
1971), p. 169. See also Fall Ccmmlttee, pp. 3146-3148. See Appendix B.
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ObregŒi and Carranza in battling Etnlllano Zapata *s agrarian legions In 
M o r e l o s . %  providing ’red battalions* to ObregSi the Casa del Obrero 
Mundial alienated Itself from the agrarian movement. Luis Ptorones, later 
to become head of the Confederac£on Regional Obrero Mexlcano (CRCM or 
Mexican Regional Federation of Labor), Influenced the World Workers' 
decision In favor of joining Obregon and Carranza. Anarchist in doc­
trine, the World Workers never had a strong Influence on the political 
system. Ihey represented, however, the first major labor organization 
In Mexico.
Hie Casa del Obrero Mundial gave way to the Mexican Regional Federa­
tion of Labor In 1917. Directed by Luis Morones, CROM subjugated anar­
chist tendencies and decided upon a nationalist course. The class strug­
gle still entered the organization’s rhetoric, but the group worked with 
the government to achieve labor reform.
Unrevolutionary in nature, Morones’ organization joined in one revolt 
before siding with the government completely. CROM supported Obregon 
against Carranza in the 1920 election and obtained scxne favor vrtien It 
aided Obregm’s successful revolt shortly after. A year before, CRCM 
had joined with the American Federation of Labor In forming the Pan 
American Federation of Labor. Hie Federation never reached the desired 
success In Latin America. Part of that failure may have related to the 
way CRCM allied itself with the Mexican Government and looked after Its
^^Vlctor Alba, The Mexicans; The Making of a Nation (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 115.
^^Ibld., p. 128.
^^Ibld., p. 133.
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own interests at the expense of non-ŒCM laborers.Numerous smaller 
organizations took in workers who were dissatisfied with CRCM. Among 
those smaller groups were the Grupo Marxist a Rojo (Red Marxist Group), a 
socialist group; the Partido Social!sta del Sureste (Southeastern Socia­
list Party), led by Salvador Alvarado of Yucatan; and the Ligas de Resis- 
tencia (Resistance Leagues), headed by Felipe Carrillo Puerto of Yucatan. 
Each of these groups, at some time or another, was seen by various ele­
ments in the United States as part of the great international Conmunist 
plot. Eknerging at the same time as the Mexican Communist Party, they may 
have had some contact, but the Mexicans preferred their own solutions to 
Mexican labor problems.
Concern with labor problems preceded the Mexican Revolution. Solu­
tions to those problems became a part of the larger scheme of national 
sovereignty vrinen the socialists got Article 123 incorporated into the 
1917 Constitution. Ihough President Carranza may have objected, he 
realized the necessity for compromise with the workers. With their dei- 
mands already incorporated in the Constitution, the workers looked toward 
the day when they would be implemented. There was no need to accept a 
foreign ideology when Mexican solutions were available in the highest 
law of the land.
Carranza’s unwillingness to act on Article 123 and 27 led to dis­
satisfaction among the workers. Mexcio proved fertile ground for the 
American radicals in the IWW. That organization sent representatives
l^Alba, The Mexicans, pp. 15O-151. 
l^Ibid., pp. 151-152.
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Into Mexico to stir up strikes and armed resistance to capitalistic 
exploitation. Here again as will be shown, some Americans saw the influ­
ence of *bolshevism.*
Bolshevism meant many things in the early 1920's. Anything or any­
one viewed as radical encountered hostility due to the fear of international 
action by Communists. Some persons refused to see the Important differ­
ences among radical elements. One such man was T. William Gates, an avid 
anti-Ccanmiunist who appeared before a Senate investigating ccninittee on 
May 8, 1920. Mr. Gates stated that Carranza allied formally in offen­
sive and defensive manner with "that organization of international oppo­
sition to democratic and free institutions ... known now in various 
countries as Bolshevists, Syndicalists, Spartacides, IWW and ... Casa 
del Obrero Mundial.
The differences among radical organizations was Important. It 
created headaches for the Ccmmunist or^tnizers. At various times in the 
1920's the Ccramunists under the direction of the Ccranunist International 
tried to discredit anarchists, trade-unionists, and reformist elements. 
Those groups were a serious threat to Ccranunist dcaminance in the labor 
movement. Together with the fact that the Mexican Revolution preceded 
the Russian Revolution^the active involvement of those groups in Mexico 
kept Communist membership to a minimum.
As will be shown^the Communist role in Mexico during the 1920's 
was small,but American oil interests and American land holders tried to 
suggest otherwise. During the height of the Red Scare of the early
^^all Committee, p. 2841.
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1920's the accusation of Conmunlsm was a useful propaganda ploy for 
special Interests. The Mexican Constitution of 1917 was radical enough 
that seme persons ccnpared It to the Soviet movement In Russia. Those 
who alleged that Communists controlled Mexican politics may have done so 
to protect their investments In JVfexlco or out of the sincere conviction 
that the United States and a particular way of life were threatened by 
an International plot. Whatever their motives may have been, those 
behind the allegations hindered the resumption of friendly relations 
between Mexico and the United States and hel^tened tensions that 
nearly brought about war between the two countries In the 1920's.
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CHAPTER II
THE CCMrNTERN AND MEXICAN COMMUNISM;
WITH A LUTLE help f rc m AMERICAN FRIENDS
Frcm the outset, the Ccmmunist s’adherence to the Marxlst-Lenlnst 
directives from Moscow encountered the problems that were to plague their 
attorpts to control and direct labor and peasant discontent In Mexico.
The same type of factionalism that prevented concerted action by labor 
before and during the first stages of the Mexican Revolution of 191O 
continued Into the Twenties. Anarchists, socialists, anarchosyndlcallsts, 
or even mild reformists claimed allegiance among the laborers and caused 
dlvlslveness among workers’ groups. Though Comintern agents Infiltrated 
many of these groups and even took control in some Instances, they failed 
to bring the different factions together under the Ccmlntem’s banner.
Another problem the Communists faced was the Mexican Revolution It­
self. It was an Indigenous, social revolution Incorporating labor and 
agrarian refroms as radical as Mexicans cared to possess. The first 
Mexican Presidents under the 1917 Constitution shied away from radical 
elements of that document aus much as possible but enforced Its provisions 
as popular pressure demanded. Mexicans could Identify therl own revolu­
tion as the guide to socio-economic reform.
Nationalism was one of the strongest motivating forces In the 
Mexican Revolution. After rejecting United States paternalism and economic
12
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exploitation, the Mexicans fPowned upon attempts by other foreigners 
to fill the vacum. The growing anti-foreignism resulting frcm the violent 
break with Spanish colonial rule, the war with the United States, the 
French intervention, and the foreign economic infiltration of Mexico was 
more than Russian-directed Communists could overcome in the Twenties or 
beyond.
The Ccmmunist attempt to gain control was significant in Mexico’s 
dealings with the United States. The mere presence of Communist elements 
in Mexico during the period that corresponded with the 'Red Scare' in the 
United States created a sensation. It affected Mexican-United States 
relations which were strained already by the conflict over the radical 
sections of the 1917 Constitution and hardships suffered by Americans in 
economic or personal ways during the violence of the IXfexican Revolution.
The two key figures in the formation of the first Communist party 
in Mexico were both foreigners; Linn Gale, an American, and Manabendra 
Nath Roy from India. The conflict and subsequent split between these 
two symbolized the factionalism faced by Communist organizational attempts.
lilnn'-A. E. Gale had served as an index clerk In the New York State 
Senate in 1913. Fran that position he moved into reporting for the 
Albany Times Union, published by former New York Governor Martin H.
Glynn. By 1916 he was working for the State's Democratic Party news­
paper. Levelling attacks at State military training and backing the 
prcmotion of able Danocrats over those with corporate affiliations. Gale 
came into conflict with his superiors. His move toward radicalism in­
creased with the start of World War I, and he fled to Mexico in order to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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17avoid military service. '
Arriving in Mexico City, Gale launched verbal attacks on the United
T AStates government and published a paper in October of 1918. Mexico 
City authorities incarcerated Gale for his radical statanents, but he was 
spared by President Venustiano Carranza. Carranza evidently took a 
liking to Gale and his antagonistic view of the American political system. 
The First Chief, as Carranza was called, suspended deportation proceedings 
against Gale and released him frcm jail. There was even sane evidence 
that Carranza may have provided funding for Gale to continue his anti- 
American publication.^^
In June, 1919, Linn Gale made the front page of The New York Times.
At the height of the "Red Scare" in the United States, New York officials 
raided the office of the Russian Soviet Bureau in New York City. Opera­
ted by a man named Martens who called himself the representative of Soviet 
Russia, the *Bureau* files disclosed correspondence between that agency 
and Linn Gale in Mexico City. The New York Times said Martens refused 
to grant Gale's request for $19,000 to support Bolshevik propaganda in 
the form of Gale's Magazine— -Journal of the New Civilization. Martens
refuæd because he believed the draft-evader was either a government agent
poor, at best, an 'adventurer. ' The incident, althou^ bringing Gale to 
public attention, indicated a severe lack of coordination by alleged 
Ccmnunists in this hemisphere.
Gale's Magazine became the official organ of the Mexican Socialist
^^The New York Times, Dec. 26, 1919, p* 6. 
1A Dec. 26, 1919, p. 6.
^^Ibid., Sept. 3, 1920, p. 9- 
20Ibid.. June 20, 1919, p. 1.
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Party. Gale Joined that small organization and entered its leadership 
by 1919. It was within this group that Manabendra Nath Roy challenged 
Gale and isolated the American fVcm the mainstream of the radical move- 
ment.
Manabendra Nath Roy opposed British colonial rule in India and 
participated in uprisings there. He was forced to flee to Mexico with 
his American wife.^^ The * Hindu ', as Rodrigo Garcia Trevinb referred to 
Manabendra Nath Roy, made use of a newspaper called El Soclalista to 
further his radical ambitions. Throu^ that media he called together 
a National Socialist Congress on September 25, 1919- At that meeting 
of various Mexican socialist groups, he explained his theory of the 
proletarian masses, the need to destroy capitalism and to establish a 
’dictatorship of the proletariat ’ as the first stage to the Communist 
s o c i e t y . N a t h  Roy, idio financed the Congress, argued with Gale over 
seating labor leader Luis IVforones. Nath Roy won the struggle, and Morones 
entered the organization. Gale thereby withdrew with his following to 
form the Communist Party of Mexico.
The Communist Party of Mexico possessed a small following. The 
executive committee consisted of Jose Refugio Rodrigues, Secretary 
General and Treasurer; Tiraoteo Garcia, organizer for agriculture and
^^Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick,
New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1957), p. 319♦
^^R. G. 59j 8l2.00b/l, Summerlin to Secretary of State, June 15, 1920.
^^Rodrigo Garcia Trevino, La ingerencia rusa en Mexico y Sudamerica 
(Mexico: Editorial, 1959), pp. 29-30.
^^Karl M. Schmitt, Conmunism in Mexico : A Study in Political
Frustration (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1965), pp. 5-6.
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fishery workers; C. F. Tabler (a naturalized American, b o m  German) 
organizer for the mining industry; Vicente Ortega, railway workers; 
Francisco Cervantes bopez, industrial workers; Maclovio Pacheca, building 
workers; and Linn A. E. Gale, publicity.
When United States authorities asked Mexico to extradite American 
draft evaders, the Mexicans were at first slow to respond. General 
Alvaro Obregôn In the spring of 1920 received such requests but refused 
to commit himself. The United States officials placed Linn Gale at the 
top of the list of those they sought to have returned from Mexico. Gale 
was especially wanted because of his activities with ’Bolshevik propa­
ganda’ . Deportation, according to the government agents, would improve 
relations between Mexico and the United States and create a friendlier 
attitude, especially among members of the American Legion who had asked 
that more decisive action be takai against Mexico.
In September, 1920, the United States prevailed. Earlier in that 
year Obregon revolted and overthrew Carranza, eliminating Gale’s pro­
tector. Adolfo de la Huerta became Provisional President. Gale's 
Ccmmunist Party of Mexico circulated pamphlets among Mexican soldiers 
slated for release. The pamphlets called upon the army to overthrow 
the Mexican Goverrment. Provisional President De la Huerta wais informed 
that the pamphlets were designed by Gale, Tabler, and Cervantes Lopez.
De la Huerta immediately began deportation proceedings.
^^The Hew York Times, Sept. 3> 1920, p. 9.
Ibid., June 7, 1920, p. 9- 
^"̂ Ibid., Sept. 3, 1920, p. 9.
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Linn Gale, his wife, and C. F. Tabler were charged with illegal 
entry and with spreading Ccmmunist propaganda In the form of Gale * s 
Magazine. They were deported and turned over to United States agents. 
From a United States jail in 1921 Gale allegedly recanted his radical 
views and severed all relations with, organizations representing radica­
lism.^^
In the meantime, Manabendra Nath Roy capitalized upon his influence 
among the socialists. Michael Borodin, an agent for the Ccmmunist Inter­
national, befriended Manabendra and converted him to the Soviet Coramu- 
nist’s cause. Joining the Ccxnintem in 1919, Nath Roy organized the 
Mexican office of the Panamerican Agency of the Ccsnmunist International. 
By the end of 1919 the Mexican segnent had taken the name Partido Comrau.- 
nista Mexicano (PCM). With Comintern money, the PCM established an 
executive ccanmittee consisting of Jose C. Valadés, M. Paley, and Felipe 
Lejia Paz. The PCM thereby supplanted the old "Marxist Red Group" that 
had been led by Francisco Cervantes, Mauro Tabon, and Nicolas Cano.31
Noting the small size of the Particio Communiste. Mexicano, Rodrigo 
Garcia Trevino commented that according to Moscow standards at the time,
-32it took only two members to achieve that classification. In 1920
pQ
The New York Times, Sept. 1, 1920, p. 17.
29Alexander, Communism, p. 320 Cas reported from New York Call,
Sept. 17, 1921.)
*̂̂ G. P. Bhattacharjee, Evolution of Political Philosophy of M. N .
Roy (Calcutta, India: Minerva Associated, 1971), p. 26.
^^Salvador de Madariaga, Latin America Between the Eagle and the Bear 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 19^2), p. 136. See also Garcia, Ingeren- 
cia, p. 30.
32Garcia, Ingérencia, p. 30.
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Manabendra N. Roy and the American Charles Phillips represented Mexico 
at the CoiTiîiunist International Congress in Moscow. While attending The 
Comintem Congress Manabendra challenged Lenin's thesis on strategy and 
tactics for colonial countries. The Comintem finally adopted a revision 
of Hoy’s plan and gave him a position on its Central Asian B u r e a u . 3 3  
Due to the reassignment Roy did not return to Mexico, but Phillips, 
another draft evader, impressed Lenin and Comintern officials with his 
reports on success in Mexico. Phillips returned to Mexico as head of 
the PGM.3^
Things were not going well for the Comintem *s Mexican agency In 
1921. At a Convention of Radical Reds in Mexico on February 15, the 
PCM was rejected for its ties with Russia and spying activities. The 
Convention published a manifesto by Manuel P m o  Briseno, Porfirio Arenas, 
and Jose H. Rodriquez. The manifesto condemned activities of Manabendra 
Nath Roy along with Prank Seaman, Jose Allen, M. Paley, Martin Brewster, 
Irwin Granich and F. G r o s e m b e r g . 3 5  last three mentioned were
Americans being watched by the United States State Department for their 
alleged ’Bolshevik’ affiliations.3^
lyfembers of The 1921 Convention formed the Confederacfon General de 
TrabaJadores (CGT or General Workers’ Confederation). While working
^%ohan Ram, Indian Cammunism: Split within a Split (New Delhi,
India: Vikas Publications, 1969), pp. 3-4.
34Alexander, Communism, p. 321.
3%arcla, Ingerencia, p. 33.
3^. G. 59, 812.00B/1, Summerlin to Secretary of State, June 15,1920.
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toward Communist principles, the CGT rejected Russian direction and 
espionage.The CGT broke all ties with the Comintem.
Seme success was reflected vhen Francisco Muglca, Governor of 
Mlchoacan, and Felipe Carrillo Puerto, Governor of Yucatan Joined the 
PCM. As Rollle Popplno points out, however, the two Joined only for 
the "political potential of the organization" and not for doctrinal 
reasons. According to Popplno, "Felipe Carrillo's abysmal Ignorance of 
Marxism and Its origins was revealed in his magnanimous offer to enploy 
Marx and Engles on his staff if they should care to come to Yucatan." 
Though Carrillo headed the Partido Soclallsta de Yucatan he would not 
change the name of this organization to fall under the Corrmunist heading.
Phillips, as director of PCM sent word to Russia that his organiza­
tion had fifteen hundred members. With that Information the Comintern 
decided the Mexicans could use some professional guidance. The Comintern 
director Zinoviev dispatched Sen Katayama and Luis Fralna to direct 
affairs. Their policy was to get the Party active In national elections 
and eliminate anarchist tendencies within the group. Katayama was a 
Japanese member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Fralna 
was active in the American Communist Party.39
The Mexican Communists received Comintem funds to participate In 
the 1923 Mexican elections. They gave 'proof* of their participation
38
3?Garcla, Ingerencia, p. 45.
gO
Rollle E. Popplno, International Canmuni^ in Latin America 
(London: The Free Press of^^lencoe, 1964T7 P* 83•
39poppino, p. 62.
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by providing fake canpaign evidence to Fradna. Their deception apparen­
tly worked, and they received money to conduct Party affairs in other 
directions. When the fraud was discovered, Fralna was removed from the 
United States Ccmmunist Party. Katayma left Mexico after only a few 
months.
In 1922 Mexican artists Diego Rivera, Jose Clemente Orozco, and 
David Alfaro Siqueiros joined the Communist Party. They produced El 
Machete as the official organ for the PCM and edged out the old Exe­
cutive Committee In 1 9 2 3 . Although recent converts, the artists 
were tolerated by the Comintern because of the prestigious look they 
gave to the PCM and the opportunity they provided for making contact 
withjyfexico’s higher social strata.
The artists on the Executive Committee were saved from a potential 
disaster when American Communist Party member Bertram Wolfe went to 
JVfexlco in 1923. Working as a school teacher while actively participa­
ting In Mexican Cannunlst affairs, Wolfe argued against backing Adolfo 
de la Huerta in the Contest with Plutarco Ellas Calles for the Presidency. 
Wolfe feared De la Huerta’s conservative backing would alienate him 
from the supporters of the ongoing Mexican Revolution. As It turned 
out, Wolfe proved correct. Calles won the struggle, and De la Huerta 
went into exile. When De la Huerta revolted, the Communists actively 
sided with President Obregon and Calles.
^^Alexander, Ccannunlsm, pp. 321-322.
^^Ibld., p. 322.
U2Popplno, p. 64.
^^Alexander, Cammunism, pp. 322-323.
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In this instance the PCM displayed Its adaptability and political 
pragnatlsm. As Minister of Finance under Obregon, De la Huerta had 
been attracted by the Coimunlsts* agrarian reform policy. He provided 
a subsidy to the Party which would have helped command sane allegiance 
fbr him had Wolfe not interfered. The exprelence tau^t Wolfe to reject 
government subsidies.
Bertram Wolfe's wisdom in the De la Huerta affair brought him a 
position on PCM's Executive Committee with Its reorganization In April 
1924. Only Rafael Carrillo remained of the old group and was named 
Executive Secretary. Wolfe was selected to represent the Party's one 
thousand members at the Fifth Congress fo the International later in 
1924.45
Shortly after De la Huerta lost in his bid to overturn the Obregon- 
Calles' control of Mexico in late 1923 and early 1924, the Executive 
Committee of the Conlntem directed Its Mexican representatives to oppose 
the Calles government. Recognizing that the Mexican workers and pea­
sants saw President Calles as, a symbol of their own struggle against the 
bourgeoisie and the institutional Church, the Comintern gave orders 
to destroy that 'Illusion.' Moscow believed that Calles stood for bour­
geois dictatorship and would eventually "be obliged to yield to imperia­
lism.
The PCM was obedient. At the April meeting of the Mexican Ccmnu-
44popplno, p. 63
45Alexander, Comnunlsm, p. 323.
^^International Press Correspondence, Nov. 8, 1928, p. 1465.
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nlst Party In 1924, maiibers criticised Calles as an associate of Ameri­
can Imperialism, fascism, and Intervention. They went one step further 
by attacking the leaders of the Confederacfon Regional Obreros ffexicana 
(CRCM or the Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers). It was bad 
enough- to declare opposition to the Revolutionary Government, but the 
Communists were to suffer more severely from active retaliation by Luis 
Napoleon Morones, head of CTSCM and Minister of Industry and Labor in 
President Calles * Cabinet.
This move against CROM and CGT leadership was part of the Comintern* s 
call for "bolshevization" of Latin American Conmunist parties. As adop­
ted by the Comintern*s Fifth Congress, this program attempted to steal 
members from anarchist and union groups. The Communists felt that added 
support was required in battling the Socialists and Fascists. Victor 
Alba claims that such a policy failed in Latin America because the
hQComintern kept its Interest directed towards Europe during this period. ° 
A new group was elected to lead the PCM. Rafael Carrillo served 
as Executive Secretary. Bertram Wolfe, David Alfaro Siqueiros, Carlos 
Rendon, Xavier Guerres, and Manuel Ramfrez made up the rest of the 
Executive Committee. This new group actively supported the peasant 
movement and the recently inaugurated Anti-Inperialist League vftiich 
later came to play an important role in United States-Mexican relations 
during a dispute over Nicaragua.
Manuel Ramirez and Ursulo Galvan represented the Mexican Communists
^^Alexander, Communism, p. 324.
^Victor Alba, Politics and the Labor Movanent Latin America 
(Stanford, California! Stanford Unversity Press, 1968), pp. 122-123.
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in the Peasant International, another organisation directed from Moscow. 
Galv^ headed the National Peasant League until the later part of 1929 
vàien the Peasant International dismissed him for allegedly conspiring
iiqwith the Mexican Government. ^
While denouncing Galvan, the Communists attempted to keep control 
of the Mexican peasantry. Following directives from Moscow, the PGM 
issued directions to peasants revolting in Durango in March 1929* By 
printing those instructions in El Machete, an organ well-watched by the 
government, the Ccmmmists succeeded only in getting a number of their 
Durango comrades captured and either imprisoned or executed.
At the end of President Calles* term in 1928, the Communists ran 
Pedro V. Rodriquez against ex-President Alvaro Obreg<:̂ . When Obregon as 
President-elect was assassinated, Bnilio Portes Gil took office as 
Provisional President and in March 1929 faced an armed insurrection by 
Generals Escobar and Aguirre. The Miexican Communists backed the govern­
ment much to the dismay of the Comintem, which called the revolt a 
struggle between bourgeois elements backed by America and Britain who 
should have been allowed to fight it out.
The Comintern* s disappointment led to a purge of the. PCM which 
eliminated Diego Rivera. He was ousted for allegedly adhering to Trot­
sky *s ideology. He confirmed the accusation by joining the international 
movement backing Trotsky. Rivera, famed artist and former mariber of 
PCM’s Executive Committee, later tried to.rejoin the Mexican Communist
^^Alexander, Communism, p. 324.
50Alba, Politics, p. 133.
51Alexander, Conmunlsm, p. 327.
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Party. Ife finally managed to beccme accepted again in 1957» a year 
before he died.^^
Mexico's Ccmmunist s' problems did not stop there. In late 1929 
the more conservative General Pascual Ortiz Rubio replaced Portes Gil 
as President to serve to the end of Obregon's elected term. Perhaps 
aware of a Communist decision in July to arm for a confrontation with 
the government. Portes Gil had already outlawed the Mexican Communist 
Party. President Ortiz Rubio began an active campaign of SLÇ)presslon 
when he succeeded Portes Gil.
The Mexican Government arrested the leaders of the PCM and officials 
of the Anti-Inperialist League, Communist trade unions, and the Young 
Communist League. In all, over three hundred persons were arrested for 
Communist activities. El Machete was legally abolished along with other 
Coanmunist news organs as President Ortiz Rubio sought to destroy the
Cilpernicious influence of the Soviet-directed radical movement in Mexico.
Three hundred arrests must have put a serious dent in the number of 
free Ccmmunist Party members in Mtexico. There is an indication that 
PCM meiribers in 1928 stood around only one thousand. B y  1929 the Party 
claimed two thousand active members in Mexico City alone. Victor Alba 
dsiputes that figure, since only four hundred Communists appeared among 
a May Day parade of seventy thousand people. Alba indicated the two
^^Alba, Politics, pp. 134-135»
^3jules Dubois, Operation America; The Corrmunist Conspiracy in 
Latin America (New York: Walker and Co., 1963), p. 330.
54Alexander, Conmunlsm, p. 329» From Inprecorr, Jan. 23, 1930. 
Madariga, Latin America, p. 137»
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thousand figure was probably an exaggeration.
The Coimunlsts remained on the outside of ]Vfexlco*s official circle
until lazaro Cardenas won the Presidency In 193^* By that time the 
Conlntem had decided It was possible to work within other organizations 
without the pressure to control them. He legalized the party again In 
1935.57
During the 1920's then, the Cormunlsts were not successful In their 
ambitious bid to organize all labor and peasant movements under their 
banner. Though- they formed numerous peasant and labor groups, the 
membership was low. Their most notable success was In infiltrating 
groups already established, but only In rare Instances did they come 
to dominate those groups.
There are several possible explanations for the Ccmlntem's failure 
In Mexico. First, as Victor Alba suggests, there was no sincere active
Interest In Latin America as late as 1929. In that year the Tenth
Plenary Meeting of the Comintem* s Executive Canmlttee heard one delegate 
explain that It was time to give real support to the small, struggling
eftLatin American parties Instead of merely Issuing resolutions. Only 
one year before, Bukharin had stated to the Sixth Congress of the Commu­
nist International, "South America Is for the first time widely entering 
the orbit of Influence of the Conraunlst International."5^ That was an
5^Alba, Politics, p. 129.
57Alexander, Communism, p. 330.
5®Alba, Politics, p. 125.
^.^^Stephen Cllssold, ed., Soviet Relations with Latin America: 1918-1968 (New York: Oxford Ifenlverslty Press, 19YU;, p. 88. J:<rom inpreccdrr,
July 25, 1929. -------
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
26
admissicai of failure at least prior to 1928.
Another suggestion as to why the Canraunists may have had so little 
success in Mexico was stated by Jules Dubois in Operation America. The 
Mexicans, according to Dubois, were tired of armed conflict after the 
bloody decade of the Mexican Revolution.^® This was evident when the 
Canminlsts directed the Durango peasants to mount a mass rebellion in 
1929 and received little response.
Probably the most significant cause for the Canintem*s failure was 
the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and the reformr-oriented Constitution of
1917. While the Revolution incorporated anti—foreign sentiments direc­
ted toward exploitation from any country, including the United States, 
Great Britain, Spain, or even Russia, it held out the hope for labor and 
agrarian reform to appease the masses of JVfexican poor. Sensitive to 
Intrusions upon their sovereignty, the Mexicans rejected Soviet Russian- 
directed politics in much the same way that they fought against United 
States economic and political influence.
The Communists did not control the Mexican Government in the Twenties. 
They were not even close. Later, in the Thirties, Cardenas may have 
used their support and incorporated some of their ideas for reform.
After he left the presidency, he openly adhered to Conmunlsm. Cardenas, 
however, can not be classed with someone like Calles who rejected 
Cardenas* extremist views. There is more evidence to suggest the Mexi­
can Government of the Twenties actively fou^t Soviet influence than 
that they may have enbraced the Canmunlst International's cause.
^®Dubois, Operation America, p. 230.
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In view of accusations In the United States press and by the members 
of the United States Government in that period, it is necessary to 
demonstrate the paucity of Comnunist influence in Mexico. At the same 
time, the fact that the Comintem's agents were active in IVfexico gives 
some credence to the fear of Ccmnunisra in the neighboring country.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER III
ALBERT FALL AND THE SENATE INVESTIGATION OF IVEXICO
As World War I came to a close, Carranza fought what appeared to 
be a losing battle to restore order in Mexico. United States citizens 
lost their property and often their lives to roving revolutionaries. 
Americans wittt property in Mexico appealed to the United States Senate 
for aid that the Carranza government was both unwilling and unable to 
give and which the State Department was too slow to provide. Finally 
in 1919 the Senate established a special sub-committee of the Foreign 
Relations Caimittee to investigate "damages and outrages suffered by 
citizens of the United States in the Republic of Mexico.
Those hearings, vdiich began on August I8, 1919, and lasted until 
May 28, 1920, covered a wide range of testimony. One idea, however, 
pervaded the vftiole spectrum of accusation. Witnesses, ranging from 
an oil magnate to a Texas Ranger to Chairman Albert Fall himself, 
claimed that radicalism served as the foundation under the chaos in 
ffexico. The Comnittee heard cries of "Bolshevism* throughout the 
course of the investigation. Bolshevism was associated sometimes with 
German intrigue or IWW Intervention, but it was used to point up a 
similarity between conditions in Mexico and Russia. The "Red Scare' 
was In full swing in the United States and special interests made 
use of American fears to appeal for Intervention in Mexico.
^%all Commit tee, p. 3.
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The Senate suh-ccnmittee, known as the Fall Ccxtinlttee for Its 
presiding manber, was not without bias. Although testimony before the 
Committee may have been sincere, it was rather selective and designed 
to portray rampant Mexican radicalism vhile embarrassing American non- 
interventionists . Senator Fall, already known for his interventionist 
views, possessed financial interests in Mexico, and these, in part, 
contributed to his view of Mexican policy. Along with other investors. 
Senator Fall sought to restore the political stability Mexico had known 
under Porfirio Dlaz.^^
The Senate saw an opportunity to question the President *s Mexican 
policy of watchful waiting. In 1914 President Woodrow Wilson had 
ertplc^ed armed intervention against Victoriano Huerta, Carranza*s 
predecessor, in Mexico. He did it not to protect economic interests 
but out of a sense of moral obligation to aid Mexico in restoring 
*democratic' government. Wilson's disinterest in foreign Investors 
and the poor results of his earlier intervention made him wary of that 
course. The Republican Sentate took up the challenge to the Democratic 
President's Ifexican policy of watchful waiting. They were motivated by 
their opposition to Wilson's foreign policy as well as concern for Ameri­
can investors and Mexico's friendly attitude toward Germany in World War 
I. The Senate was inclined to compel Mexico to accept her "international 
obligat ions
Michael C. Meyer, "Albert Bacon Fall's JVfexican Papers: A Prelimi­
nary Investigation," New Mexico Historical Review, XL (April, 1965), p. 
l66. This article also discusses the many biases and inaccuracies of the 
Fall Canmittee hearings and suggests ways to check the validity of infor­
mation frcm the voluræs.
^^CcLllahan, American Foreign Policy, p. 577.
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When accusations of Bolshevism appeared In the testimony before 
the Fall Canmittee, Bolshevism was usually Ill-defined or associated 
with differing Ideologies without concern for basic differences. 
Capitalists saw the Tfejclcan nationalists* challenge to their interests 
as part of an international movement to abolish private property. Eber 
Cole Eyam, a United States citizen udio had worked with railroads and 
lumbering in Mexico, brought sane of the associated terms together in 
the following statement before the Committee.
The Ifexican revolutionists have called themselves 
•liberals* when in point of fact they are socialists, and we 
know to-day that socialism does not differ greatly fron bolshe­
vism. Solcallsm Is the theory, bolshevism the fact. The 
Ifexlcan revolutionists —  have sought to establish an atheis­
tic tyranny.
Byam added that the Mexican laborers were really content and only stirred 
to radicalism by socialist a g i t a t o r s . ^5
When Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 returned 
ownership of subsoil rights to the Mexican State, American oil investors 
coqplalned loudly. They formed The Association of Oil Producers In 
Mexico and joined with a more broadly based group. The National Associa­
tion for the Protection of American Rights In Mexico (NAPARM). Together, 
these groups presented their case before the Pall Canmittee and asked 
the United States Government for protection.
^^all Caimittee, p. 2700.
^^Ibld., p. 2688.
^^See Fall Caimittee, p. 33 for a list of oil conpanles in the 
National Association for the protection of American Rights in Mexico. 
For NAPARM goals, membership requirements, etc. see Fall Caimittee,
pp. 405-407.
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Major John G. McDonnell (retired), as a field representative for 
the National Association for the Protection of American Rights in 
Mexico, gave his own view of Bolshevism in Mexico in a newspaper inter­
view in San Francisco. Charles Boynton, head of NAPARM, agreed that 
Major McDonnell's remarks were 'proper*. According to McDonnell:
Mexico is a haven of refuge to which the IWW, vdddh is an 
alias for anarchists, were sent to be tutored by German 
Propagandists. Ihe product of this joint labor of anarchy and 
Kultur was Bolshevism, vâiich was first put into effect in 
Mexico in all its details, even to public ownership of women 
and corruption of children. Bolshevism was transplanted from 
Ffexico to Russia, vihere it is now bearing its perfect fruit.
From its original source in Mexico the evangelists of anarchy 
hope to introduce it in the United States. They have made 
no little progress.
Included in Major McDonnell's accusations were the notions that Carranza
had paid press agents in the United States who deliberately created
false impressions of Mexico; that Mexico could not have free government
due to poor education; and that Mexican elections were more a matter of
'deceit, corruption, and personal and political revenge. ' Major McDonr-
nell called the IVtexican Constitution 'out—and—out Bolshevism in practice'
and a step toward ending private p r o p e r t y . T o  support his contentions
Major McDonnell gave a translation of Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican
Constitution.
Petroleum interests based their legally obtained rights to subsur­
face materials on Mexico's Federal Mining Law of Novoriber 22, 1884. 
According to that law, established under Porfirio Diaz, subsoil rights 
went to the owner of the land.^® In direct contradiction, the
^^Fall Comnittee, p. 415. 
68Ibid., p. 3271.
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Constitution of 1917 reverted back.to colonial patterns of subsurface
ownership in that the sovereign state ultimately owned eill subsurface
products. Ihe American oil investors claimed even the old law did not
give oil rights to the government and quoted an old Spanish law which
referred to *metals * and not 'minerals. * They further argued that the
Constitution of 1917 was the "supreme law of the land." Article l4 of
that Constitution prohibited retroactive application of laws, and, there-
70fore, applied to the Constitution itself.
Individual members of NAPARM went to some length to deny that they 
published propaganda for armed intervention in Mexico during 1919. They 
took the stance that others, especially a group called the League of 
Free Nations, were promoting propaganda favoring Carranza and non-inter­
vention. Although NAPARM denied pressuring for armed intervention, it 
did not eliminate that event as a course of action for the United States 
Government. Its members sought any means available to protect American 
lives and property in Mexico.
On September 12, 1919, the Fall Committee heard from Edward L. 
Doheny, oilman and personal friend of Senator Fall, later to became 
inplicated with Fall in the Teapot Dome oil lease scandal. Doheny said 
his oil porperties in Mexico produced $18,500,000 worth of petroleum in
1918. He complained that taxes doubled in Jfexico that year and, along 
with his United States taxes raised for the war, his conpany was taxed
^%all Committee, p. 3271. 
^°Ibid.. pp. 3272-3273. 
^^Ibid., pp. 400-600 passim.
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6oj5 of Its profits or 20% of Its gross income. Explaining his problems 
in dealing with Carranza's Mexico, part of Doheny*s testimony was 
described in the New York Times as follows :
Showing strong feeling for the first time in his 
testimony, he leaned toward Senators Pall and Brandegee as 
he declared: 'In my opinion the same Bolshevist influences
were and are at work in Mexico as are responsible for the terror 
in Russia. ' '
The New York Sun quoted Doheny as stating that Americans participated 
in spreading Bolshevism to both Mexico and Russia. He did not, however, 
identify those involved.Doheny cut short his conversation on the 
topic by expressing the depth of his feeling:
I really should not comment very much on that, because 
vtoen I go into the subject I get to expressing an opinion; and 
if I were to express ny opinion of seme of those vAio are respon­
sible for the bloodshed in Mexico and the bloodsh^ in Russia,
X might possibly be subject to a charge of libel.'
The discussion of Bolshevian actually constituted a small part 
of Doheny's testimony. Significantly, however, leading papers ^ v e  
emphasis to that aspect of his statements. Most of his talk related to 
oil development in Mexico. He insisted that the United States had to 
encourage its promoters and investors to bring oil production in all 
the world under American control.
In October, 1919, relations betweai the United States and Mexico
72The New York Times, Sept. 12, 1919, p. 17.
'̂̂The New York Sun, Sept. 12, 1919, frcm a clipping in the William 
P. Buckley Papers.
^^all Committee, p. 231.
^^The New York Sun, Sept. 12, 1919, frcm a clipping in the William 
P. Buckley Papers.
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underwent a severe strain. In that monttt a roaming band of revolutio­
naries captured United States Consular Agent William 0. Jenkins In 
Puebla. The State Department protested to the Carranza Government which 
remained Inactive In the case. When Jenkins was finally released on 
ransom in November, Carranza had him arrested for acting in concert with 
the revolutionaries. Again Secretary Lansing protested for the United 
States, and newspapers In both countries talked about an impending war
On November 26, 1919» The New York Times carried an article which 
quoted Senator James E. Watson as saying the Carranza Government was 
planning to turn Mexico over to a radical element associated with Russian 
Soviets plotting to Invade the United States. That plan allegedly called 
for a Soviet Government In Colorado aided by an army of 60,000 Reds al- 
eady In the United States! With that plot scheduled to go off three 
weeks frcm the published date, ' Senator Watson said, "There Is no room in 
the United States for the red flag of socialism or the black flag of an­
archy." He claimed the solution was to provide land for every American 
as such ownership would prevent anarchism.
The editorial staff of The New York Times ridiculed Senator Watson* s 
revelation. In an editorial titled "Saved by a Senator" the newspaper 
said, "Heaven knows vrtiat might have happened If the Senator had not Impar­
ted his dread secret to the American Club of Indianapolis. Quick, Watson!
The Needle!"?8
^toward F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge : Harvard 
University Press, 1953)» pp. 190-191* See also Manuel A. Machado, Jr., 
and James T. Judge, "Tempest In a Teapot?! The Mexican-United States In­
tervention Crisis of 1919»" Southwestern Historical Quarterly (July, 1970) 
PP• 1-23.
^^The New York Times, Nov. 26, 1919» p- 10.
78ibld., Nov. 27, 1919, p. 14.
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The Jenkins affair coincided with the accusations of Mexican ties 
to Bolshevism andwlthPresident Wilson*s collapse. Pushing for ratifica­
tion of his program incorporating the League of Nations in a country­
wide tour, Wilson was struck by exhaustion on Septesriber 25, in Pueblo, 
Colorado. Upon returning to the White House, he suffered a cerebral 
throribosis on October 2. Working fron his bed in the White House, 
President Wilson became the object of suspicion. Many, Including United 
States Seantors, feared the President had died or had becone totally 
Incapacitated and that his wife and friends gave the directives which 
enaerged from the White House.
On Decanber 2, Senator Fall introduced a resolution in the Senate
calling for approval of actions which the State Department might take
with reference to Mexico during the Jenkins crisis. He asked that the
United States withdraw recognition and sever diplomatic relations with
Mexico’s Carranza Government. One of Senator Pall's Justifications
was that Mexicans had spread Bolshevik propaganda and had attempted to
fanent revolution ini the IMlted States. Senator Fall convinced some
Senators that war was the best solution. Many, however, waited for
80Secretary Lansing's comment.
The Republican Sonate took this opportunity to find out whether 
the President was really alive or capable of making decisions. Secre­
tary Lansing suggested a delay until the President could be informed 
about the Mexican situation. The Senate voted to send two representa­
tives to President Wilson to provide that needed information. Senator
^^Fall Committee, p. 843c.
80The New York Times, Dec. 4, 1919, pp. 1-2.
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Fall was selected as a logical choice since he had been investigating 
Mexican affairs. Senator Hitchcock was to accanpany him to the White 
House. Aimed with Senator Fall's proposed resolution they went to see 
the President.
The Senate representatives found President Wilson alive and in full 
possession of his faculties. From his bed, the President listened 
attentively as Senator Fall explained his resolution and spoke about 
conditions in Mexico. Senator Fall emphasized material relating to 
Mexican officials and their alleged involvement in propagandizing for 
the Bolsheviks in the United States. Before the two left. President
Wilson asked for a written memo describing the same material the Senators
8?had presented verbally.
Senator Fall's own view of the situation in Mexico was portrayed by 
his selective use of material gathered in the hearings of his carmittee 
investigating Mexico. He stressed evidence of radicalism and conspiracy 
in his written message to the President. Among his charges were those 
that Carranza was in league with 'extreme radical' elements in the 
United States to propagandize this country, that the 1917 Mexican 
Constitution was ccmparable to the doctrine of the Soviet Government in 
Russia, that Carranza favored the 'Plan of San Diego of 1915'' (an 
alleged plot to secure the independence of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, 
upper California, paving the way for annexation by Mexico), and that 
'extreme agitators and IWW members* planned to overthrow the United 
States Government while promising territory to Mexico for aid in the
®^Callahan, American Foreign Policy, p. 578.
Qp
The New York Times, Dec. 6, 1919, p. 2 and Fall Comnittee, p. 8430.
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revolt. At that stage Senator Fall said he had done his duty by Informing 
the President and leaving him with the respcnsibility for action. He 
decided to continue his investigation into Mexican affairs.
While Senators Fall and Hitchcock were at the White House, Wilson * s 
physician came in with the dramatic news that Consular Agent Jenkins had 
been released by Carranza. Later, Senator Fall stated that he would 
not withdraw his resolution as it did not deal specifically with the 
Jenkins' case. Sane Senators disagreed. They claimed it was now up to
Oh
the President to conduct affairs with Mexico.
President Wilson had opposed any aimed interventicn against 
Mexico in the Jenkins' affair. He was pleased vÆien the consular agent 
was released. Wilson was not, however, pleased with Secretary Lansing. 
Lansing had consulted with Fall before the Senator introduced his resolu­
tion and had given at least tacit support. Lansing's resignation as 
Secretary of State in February of 1920 and his replacement by Bainbridge 
Colby may have been a direct result of the disagreonent Lansing had 
with the President concerning M e x i c o .
On December 8, 1919, President Wilsjai replied to Senator Fall.
He took objection to the Senators' initiative in the area of foreign 
affairs claiming that it was not in line with Constitutional practices.
On the resolution itself, Wilson wrote that he would be "gravely concerned 
to see any such resolution pass the Congress» Upon learning President
^^all Canmittee, pp. 834 E, F, G, H, I, J.
^\he New York Times, Dec. 6, 1919, p. 2.
OC
Callahan, American Foreign Policy, pp. 578-579. 
®^all Canmittee, p. 843 D.
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Wilson's attitude. Senator Lodge, Chairman of the Foreign Relations
Cyrj
Canmittee announced that the Fall resolution was dropped.
Tbs Mexicans were quick to reply- %Aen Senator Fall accused them of 
spreading Bolshevik propaganda in the United States. Mexican Consul 
General Ramon P. de Negri in New: York was first to deny the charge. He 
said President Carranza desired respect for all foreign countries and 
their governments. De Negri was backed by Consul General J. Garza Aer-
OOtuche in San Francisco. Mexican Ambassador Ygnaclo Bonilleis in Wash­
ington said the îfexican Govemnent opposed anti-social doctrines and 
denied that his embassy had aided Bolsheviks, IWW's, or anarchists In 
the United States. An editorial in The New York Times also denounced 
Senator Fall's accusations as sensational. Ihe editorial indicated 
admiration for Ambassador Bonillas and rejected the idea that he had 
entered Into a Bolshevik plot. The paper added that the Senate acted 
iirproperly in requesting President Wilson to act on Mexico as that was 
"entirely the President's business." That arugment backed the position 
President Wilson actually took In responding to Senator Fall.^^
The Fall Carmittee continued to function after the Jenkins* 
affair. Even while Senate representatives consulted wrlth the White 
House, the Carmittee carried on with Its job. On December 6, William 
F. Buckley appeared to testify about Carranza and General Obregon. Mr.
^^Ihe New York Times, Dec. 9, 1919, p. 1. 
^^Ibld.. Dec. 4, 1919, p. 2.
^^Ibld., Dec. 5, 1919, p. 2.
90Ibid., Dec. 5, 1919, p. 4.
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Buckley J a dealer In Mexican real estate and oil leases, said the 
difference between Carranza and the original revolt under Francisco 
Madero was that Madero favored democratic government while Carranza 
sought radical social change Including elimination of private property 
and expulsion of Americans from Mexico. Although Carranza was essen­
tially conservative, he did yield to popular pressures.Mr. Buckley 
was referring to the Idea of land as a 'social function* to be used for 
the well-being of the State when needed. Later In his testimony Buckley 
said that interpretation was common to "Carranza's Mexico and Trotsky's 
Russia. "92 Alghough. Mr. Buckley rejected direct armed intervention, 
others vôio favored that violent policy used his same analogy between 
Russia and Mexico.
Mr. Charles Boynton, head of the National Association for the 
Protection of American Rl#its In Mexico, produced a press release that 
read as follows ;
 ̂ Judging from what has been published about Russia,
conditions can hardly be worse there. If, Indeed, they are 
as bad, as in Mexico. And It must not be forgotten that 
Carranza Is the original bolshevlst, or perhaps he may have 
gotten the Idea frort William Bayard Hale and Lincoln Steffens 
and their German fiends. At least, they had long conferences 
with him at the outset of Carranza's public career, and they 
were all very thick.93
It was not the first claim that Bolshevism entered Russia after Mexico.
The charges were far-fetched with regard to Hale and Steffens, however.
91pall Canmittee, p. 796. For information of Carranza's conserva­
tive attitude see Lorenzo Dfeyer Cosld, "El Confllcto Petrolero entre 
IVfexico y los Est ados Unldos, 1917—1920," Foro Intemaclonal, ((April, 
1965)9 passim.
92ibld., p. 827.
93jbid., p. 465.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
William Bayard Hale had served as President Wilson*s official investi­
gator concerned with the diplomatic corps in Mexico in 1913. Lincoln 
Steffens did cultivate a personal tie with Carranza, but for the purpose 
of producing ’muckrake* writings on United States policy rather than 
promoting Bolshevism.
The Fall Committee tried to înplicate Mexicans as well as Americans
/in the Bolshevik conspiracy charges. On January 3, 1920, Emiliano Lopez 
Fig>aeroa, a Mexican representing Mexican National Railways in New York, 
appeared before the Committee. Under questioning by committee member 
Francis Kearful, Figueroa protested that he could not and would not 
discuss matters relating to his own country or the Jenkins incident. 
Kearful disclosed Figueroa’s association with the magazine De la Raza 
which had carried an article on Lenin and one on the democratic, humani­
tarian nature of the 1917 Mexican Constitution. The article called the 
Mexican Constitution the ’orüy step toward real liberty’ outside of the 
Soviet Union and favored nationalization of oil properties in Mexico. 
Though Figueroa denied knowledge of the particular article and claimed no 
responsibility for editorial judgement, Kearful had made his point.
Investigator Kearful was quite harsh vhen Figueroa refused to 
answer questions relating to internal conditions in Mexico and matters 
of opinion. At one point Kearful told the witness:
You are living in this country under the protection
^^Lincoln Steffens, The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1931Ja pp. 731-732.
95pall Canmittee, pp. 895-899.
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of Its laws, and you are connected with a magazine which, 
from an article in the Decehber number, seems to indicate a 
policy favorable to the Russian Bolsheviki, and you decline 
to testify to your own convictions in regard to the nationali­
zation of property, which is one of the prime elements of the 
Russian system.
With that comment, Kearful dismissed Figueroa with a hint that future 
action would be considered against the witness for his refusal to ans­
wer certain questions.
At this time the State Department received an official protest frcm 
the Mexican Secretariat of Foreign Relations. He claimed the Fall Com­
mittee was formed by interventionists seeking to Justify armed interfer­
ence in Mexico. The Mexican Government refused to recognize the author­
ity of that Committee and made it an act of treason for Mexicans Tnftio 
appeared before the Committee to give evidence that could be used against 
Mexico in any way. The Mexican Government warned its citizens in the 
United States to allow arrest if necessary to keep from going before the 
investigators.57 Figueroa had good reason to object to questions.
One prominent witness before the Fall Committee had personal 
reasons for appearing voluntarily to denounce Mexican radicalism and 
the Revolution. Jahn A. Vails, district attorney for the forty-ninth 
Judicial district of Texas since 1902, gave testimony on January 22.
The son of a Spanish-bom father who was nationalized during resi­
dence in Brownsville, Texas, John Vails had personal feelings for 
Porfirio Diaz. In 1893 Diaz had offered Vails a Job as Mexican
5 % ’all Comnittee, p. 1200. 
57p. G., 59, 711.12/253.
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consul In Brovmsville. Although, the job was appealing, Vails turned
qO
it down because he had "always been so thoroughly American."
That offer endeared the aging Mexican President to Attorney Vails. 
When Madero revolted against Diaz, Vails wrote to the Mexican President 
telling him not to abdicate. Vails said he had developed a 'filial 
affection for Diaz *. ̂ 9 it was no surprise then that John Vails spoke 
harshly about Carranza and introduced evidence on a radical plot 
called the ’Plan of San Diego. ’
A copy of the Plan of San Diego, named after the small Texas 
town where it was signed on January 6, 1915, went into the Committee 
records. It called for liberty for American Negroes and independence 
for Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and Upper California.
Though claiming no aid fran the Mexican Government, the Plan suggested 
the territory gained might go to Mexico through annexation at a later 
time.
With a red flag as banner, the adherents of the Plan called for 
the attack to begin on February 20, 1915. Only the old men, the women, 
and children would escape death sentences according to the document.
Adult males, other than the elderly, were to be killed. Although the 
plot appeared absurd. Attorney Vails, took it seriously #ien a red flag 
with white diagonal stripe was found after a raid at Webb Station, Texas. 
Mr. Vails did not associate the Plan of San Diego with Communists,
^^all Committee, p. 1200. 
99ibld., p. 1200.
^Q°Ibid., pp. 1205-1207.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
but others did. Captain W. M. Hanson, a Senior Captain of the Texas 
Rangers assigned as an aide to the Pall Committee, said extreme 
radicals Issued propaganda against the United States Goverrment as 
part of the Plan of San Diego as late as March of 1920. Those radicals, 
according to Captain Hansen, were Ccranunlsts and manbers of the IWW.^^^ 
One witness before the Ccranlttee claimed all the radicalism in 
Mexico and Russia emanated from Germany. William Gates, a writer 
with deep concern over Ccmnunlsm In Mexico, said German agents had
102spread the same ’radical antl-soclal* doctrines to Mexico and Russia.
In fact the Flan of San Diego may have had German origins. It was
part of the Infamous Zimmerman Telegram vôilch the United States
obtained and used as one of the Justifications for entering Into 
103World War I. To state that Geiman representatives were responsible 
for the turmoil In Russia or Mexico, however. Is to der%r the real 
Indigenous, nationalist background of both the Mexican Revolution and 
the Russian revolt. Gates also testified that radicals in Mexico 
were few In number and associated with Carranza and "that Pan-Latin, 
one big union, bolshevlst aggregation.
A -House of Representatives ' committee investigating Immigration 
added to Senator Fall ' s Information on radicalism along the Mexican 
border. Anthony Camlnettl, Director of Immigration, told the Invest 1-
^°^all CcDinlttee', pp. 3241-3242.
^°^Ibld., p . 2847.
^^^Barbara Tuchman, The Zimmerman Telegram (New York: The
Viking Press, 1958), pp. 96-97.
^^Vall Ccranlttee, p. 2844.
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gators that vdille the administration looked to Europe hundreds of
radicals entered the United States across the Mexican border due to
a reduced border patrol. He said radicals saw Mexico as an easy inlet
105into the Iftiited States. At the conclusion of hearings before the 
House Ccranittee, Chairman Albert Johnson recarmended tighter controls 
to keep ’Russian Reds' from entering through M e x ico.Caminetti 
later said he had ordered inmlgration officials along the border to 
forward a report on the threatened invasion from Mexico of fifty 
Russian Bolsheviki and 150 Mexican IWW's. Caminetti said there was 
no reason to be aroused as border troops could handle the Invasion 
should it occur.
Miss Lucille Wetherell, a writer and lecturer, went before the 
Fall Committee to suggest President Wilson's policy of 'watchful 
waiting' aided Ccmnunists in Mexico. She said the Mexican Revolution, 
initiated by Madero, was "sinply one link in a great attempt to put 
the world into internationalism. " Calling Mexico a "propagating
ground for Bolshevism against the United States," Miss Wetherell cri­
ticized President Wilson for abdicating responsibilities under the
Monroe Doctrine and giving the Bolsheviks a greater grasp in the
109western hemisphere. Her testimony supported the Committee's
*̂̂ % he New York "Tribune, Oct. 21, 1919, fhcm a clipping in the 
William F. Buckley Paper.
^^^The New York Times, Nov. 24, 1919, p. 1.
107The Evening Telegram (New York), Dec. 11, 1919, from a 
clipping in the William F. Buckley Papers.
^°®Fall Committee, p. 1701.
^°^Ibid., p. 1703.
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critical view of American Inaction with regard to Mexico.
Numerous other accusations of Communism In IVfexlco were made 
before the Fall Ccmralttee In late 1919 and early 1920. They were 
designed to frighten United States citizenry as the charges appeared 
in American newspapers and were Inportant for the Impact they had on the 
Committee’s final report. They alleged that Carranza and later Mexi­
can Presidents Obregon and Calles were all Involved In a Bolshevik 
conspiracy agalret Mexico and the United States. All three Mexican 
leaders adhered to the 1917 Mexican Constitution which oil Investors 
and land speculators said was Communistic. When Senator Fall and his 
colleagues wrote the final report of the Ccranlttee on May 28, 1920, 
charges of Mexican radicalism entered their justifications for actions 
against Mexico.
When the Comnlttee finished Its Investigation, Venustlano Carranza 
was still President. By May 28, 1920, vAien the report came out, Obregon 
had successfully revolted and forced Carranza out of power. In the 
meantime Adolfo de la Huerta was Installed as Provisional President.
The Ccmralttee Report made the following reccmmendatlons for dealing with 
rfexlco under De la Huerta: 1. The United States should wlthold recogni­
tion from De la Huerta until some assurance would be given that Mexico 
would abide by International law. 2. Article 130 on Missionaries, 
Article 27 on property and subsoil rl^ts, and Article 33 giving
110For more testimony on the radical actions of Carranza, Obregon, 
and Calles, see Fall Ccranlttee, pp. 2931a 2418, 2099. See also pp. 
1943-1945 on charges that Dr. Atl (Gerardo Murillo), Director of the 
Mexican National Academy of Fine Arts, was a Ccranunlst. For Information 
on Ilnn Gale and Mexican Ccranunlsm see Fall Committee, p. 1237.
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the Mexican President authority to eapel foreigners without the judi­
cial process should not apply to American citizens. 3« The United 
States ahould jnalntaln the right to refuse recognition unless Mexico 
would accept the demands of this report. 4. If any further acitons 
threatening American life or property should occur in Mexico under a 
government that would not accept the demands of this report, the United 
States would reserve the right to "send a police force" into l̂ fexico to 
establish order and protect American Interests. The report ended by 
saying the fourth item would be not an act of war and made reference to 
the Golden Rule. It stated the police action would be designed to give 
the Mexican people an opportunity to set up a "government of serious, 
competent, honesband honorable men who will meet the civilized world 
upon friendly ground and hind themselves to deal with other people 
as they themselves would be dealt with."^^^
President Wilson rejected the proposal for various reasons. The 
recommendation espoused for a type of overt moral imperialism which 
President Wilson apparently rejected after the poor results of his in­
vasion of Vera Cruz in 1914. Chances for stability increased viien 
Provisional President De la ffiaerta put down a revolt by General Pablo 
Gonzales and purchased the pacification of Francisco *Pancho* Villa. 
When Obregon announced that he would not enforce Article 27 most of the 
problems of American investors appeared solved. Armed intervention did
not occur, but Wilson decided to wait before providing official recogni-
112tion to the new Mexican Government.
^^%all Ccranittee, pp. 3368-3373•
^^^Callahan, American Foreign Policy, p. 582.
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The Pall Ccranlttee was a product of Its times. Biased from the 
beginning with a chairman who favored intervention and backed by a 
Republican Senate dissatisfied with a Democratic President*s foreign 
policy, the Ccranlttee solicited evidence to prove Mexico was following 
a radical path, in dlsre^irdlng American life and property south of 
the Rio Grande. Evidence did suggest a heavy loss of American lives 
In Mexico during the Revolution, but Mexican Consular Agent De Negri 
In New York ccmpUed a booklet suggesting similar outrages against 
Mexicans In the United S t a t e s . T h e  charge of Bolshevism also had 
seme backing with evidence submitted on Linn Gale, the IWW, and other 
radicals vito may have sympathized with the Russian Revolution. The 
charges of foreign Interference, however, were all out of proportion.
Mexicans disliked foreigners Interfering in their politics as 
evidenced in Article 30 of the 1917 Constitution which expressly out­
lawed such actions. linn Gale was deported under that provision, 
and Mexico broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in the 
late 1920*5 for the same reason. Mexico*s Revolution was, above all, 
an exertion of sovereignty and national pride.
Naturally, large and small Investors saw "Red" when it appeared 
they would lose property or oil rights In Mexico. It Is debatable, 
however, whether they shouted "Bolshevism" fron sincere belief or as 
a ploy for popular sentiment at the height of fears engendered by 
the recent Russian Revolution. Whatever the case, the tactic failed, 
especially since the Fall Ccranlttee suggestions were never implemented.
^^%all Ccranlttee, p. 2954.
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With De la Huerta, Obregon, and Calles in ccantrol in Mexico, it 
appeared that Mtexicanr^nited States relations would move toward 
stability in the 1920's.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER IV
MEXICAN PRESIDENTS OBREGON AND CALLES, 1920-1926 
CONFUSING THE ISSUES
Gaieral Alvaro Obregon*s revolt in %»ril 1920 destroyed Senator 
Fallas cbances for obtaining Intervention In Mexico based on charges 
that Carranza adhered to Bolshevism, In late May, Carranza was killed 
in his flight from Miexlco City, and Adolfo de la Huerta became Provisio­
nal President. The basic question of depredations against Americans and 
their holdings in Mexico, however, remained. The 1917 Mexican Con­
stitution continued as a major irritant in United States-Mexican 
relations. American oil interests and land Investors sought protection 
from confiscation and satisfaction for property alreac^ lost during 
the Revolution. Unsuccessful in arousing support for intervention. 
United States businessmen still maintained hope in the weapon of 
United States non-recognition of Mexico and the election of Republi­
can President Warren G. Harding.
The ailing President Wilson did not grant recognition to De la 
Huerta as Provisional Mexican President or to Alvaro Obregon who was in­
augurated into the Mexican Presidency in November 1920. Instead, Wilson 
left the problem of recognition to his successor. President Harding’s 
attitude toward recognition of Mexico surfaced in an announcement by the 
new Secretary of the Interior appointee Albert Fall. The Senator said:
49.
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So long as I have anything to do with the Mexican question, 
no government of Mexico will be recognized, with iqy consent, 
which does not first enter into a written agreanent premising 
to protect American citizens and their property rights in 
Mexico.
Anxious as the Mexicans may have been for recognition that encouraged
investors and lenders. President Harding held off until the Mexican
President would make a ccnmittment in writing.
President Cbregcn took a conciliatory attitude toward the United
States in hopes of getting recognition without written assurances for
Americans who had Incurred losses or who might lose property under
Article 27. P^cm 1921 to early 1923 the two governments exchanged
notes on a proposed treaty of amity and ccmmerce without coming to
an agreement on conditions to be discussed. Throughout that tense
period. Involving an American oil shutdown in Mexico to protest higher
taxes and President Harding's dispatch of troops to the border for
preparation to protect American lives and property, the United States
Department of State investigated charges of Bolshevism levelled at 
%Obregon and his associates.
As part of the conciliatory attitude toward the United States 
both Provisional President De la Huerta and later President Obregon took 
measures to eliminate Bolshevism in Mexico. Obregon and De la Huerta 
expressed bitter resentment when Linn Gale wrote that the two Mexican 
leaders were sympathetic to the radical c a u s e . O n  June 7, 1920
112iCallahan, American Foreign Policy, p. 586.
115New York Times, June 7, 1920, p. 9.
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De la Huerta Issued Instructions to the Mexico City police chief to 
arrest all Bolsheviks and extreme radicals. He refused to allow Mexico 
to serve as a center for propaganda. Deportation proceedings bagan, 
and five Russians were ousted fran Mexico for propagandizing.
During 1920 De la Huerta took numerous ' actions against alleged 
Bolsheviks. He deported a number of American radicals who were wanted 
In the United States for draft evasion. Including Linn Gale.
He also ordered suspension of Bolshevik publications In Mexico and 
prevented radical meetings In the Federal District. A petition by 
socialists to establish a university In Mexico City was denied, and 
De la Huerta topped off the antl-Bolshevlk crusade for the year by 
arresting nearly one thousand military personnel for meddling In 
politics under alleged Bolshevik Inspiration.
De la Huerta blamed Americans for much of the problem with Bolshevism. 
He claimed the Iniustrleil Workers of the World carried on Bolshevik 
propaganda and that Communists belonged to that organization. Propa­
ganda from the IWW, according to the Provisional President, was aimed 
at bringing the Mexican proletariat together under an "advanced Socialism, 
that Is, BolshevlanU Although a Mexico City newspaper reported
an increase in Bolshevism In Mexico because funds were available from 
the United States branch of the IWW, Mexican officials denied Bolshevism
^^^The New York Times, June 8, 1920, p. 32.
117Ibid.. July 23, 1920, p. 22; July 27, 1920, p. 17; July 28, 
1920, p. 1; Sept. 3, 1920, p. 9; Aug. 28, 1920, p. 4; Aug. 29, 1920, 
II, p. 1; Sept. 13, 1920, p. 17.
-• "I Q
Ibid., Sept. 3, 1920, p. 9.
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ïiad any real strength In that country. Instead, they claimed opposi­
tion elements In the upcoming electIcai provoked radicalism.^1^ One of 
the candidates In that election, Alvaro Obregon, said he would not 
sillaw Bolshevism in Mexico. General Obreg<^ Indicated that the 1917 
Constitution forbade foreigners from interfering in IVfexican politics 
and that he would not allow political agitation that might injure 
Mexico.
A few days after Obreg^ made the above statement in September, 
1920, an incident occured at the National Palace which fanned charges 
of Mexican Bolshevism in the American press. A group of demonstrators 
with a parade pemnit marched to the Palace to present to Provisional 
President De la Huerta a petition against the high cost of living. 
According to press reports representatives from the group entered the 
Palace and side-tracked to a balcony where they addressed the crowd 
outside. An ex-Congressman unfurled a number of red and black flags 
while labor leader Luis Morones ’harangued' those gathered. The 
demonstration ended writh an address by Felipe Carrillo Puerto, Yucatan 
socialist, and short term member of the Communist Party who called for 
attacks on private property and immediate raids on food shops.
While The New York Times called the demonstration a Communist 
display. De la Huerta and Obregon denied any association with the 
group. President De la Huerta, who was ill at Chapultapec Castle
^^^The New York Times, Aug. 29, 1920, II, p. 1.
^^°Ibid., Sept. 15, 1920, p. 8.
121Ibid., Sept. 28, 1920, p. 5 and Sept. 28, 1920, p. 17.
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wiien the demonstration occured, later said he would not allow such 
‘nonsense* In the future. He expressed syirpathy for the workingmen 
but would not tolerate any but legal change. He told the Procurator 
General to Investigate and report his findings to the Congress that 
they might censure any Congressmen Involved In the alleged Ccramunlst 
outburst. Presidential Candidate Obregon was Indignant over the demon­
stration. He agreed that violent preachings against the Mexican Govern­
ment could not be tolerated.
In denouncing the demonstration at the National Palace, General 
Obregon gave some Insight into the way he viewed the workers ‘ movement 
and special interests. He said be had the support of numerous parties, 
but he was obligated to none Individually and had made no coipranlses. 
h-Tr view of the President‘s role followed;
You may be well assured that all measures favoring 
the workingnen or others must be taken through legal means.
A President of Mexico represents 14,000,000 people, and he 
cannot listen to only a few hundred here or ther*e. but must 
consider the necessities of the greater n u m b e r .
The denonstratlon did not have the desired effects sought by its 
leaders. No shops suffered from looting, and some of the more conser­
vative members of the march against the high cost of living entered 
the cathedral and rang the bells to drown out the speakers when they
1 ohappeared on the balcony. Moreover, the display risked alienating the 
two men #io could do the most for social change. De la Huerta and Obregon,
New York Times. Sept. 29, 1920, p. 17. 
^^^Ibid. 
l̂ Îbld.
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In November 1920, a month after the radical speeches from the 
balcony at the National Palace, Luis Morones showed how far removed he 
was from the Communists. In that month the dockworkers In Veracruz 
went on strike against low wages and the high cost of living. A 
Communist meeting on November 9 In Mexico City voted to call a general 
strike In favor of the Veracruz strikers. The government called out 
troops to protect property with whatever extreme measures where neces­
sary". CRCM, under the leadership of Pforones, denounced the general 
strike. CRCM officials refused to recognize any authority of the 
Mesxlcan Ccranunlsts In the labor m o v e m e n t . The dockworkers 
went back to work In Veracruz when troops under Minister of War Plu- 
tarco Ellas Calles disarmed them and mediated the dispute with the man­
agement. Here Morones, a former member of the Ccranunlst Party, sided 
with the government as he would do to a larger extent later as Minister 
of Industry, Labor, and Coranerce under President Calles.
All of these Incidences of 'Bolshevlan* occured against the back­
ground of the Mexican Government’s desire for United States recogni­
tion and American hopes for claim settlements and assurances of protec­
tion for property holders In Mexico. The evidence suggests that the 
Mexican Government In this period actively combatted Ccranunlst influences, 
Behind the scenes, however, the United States State Department inves­
tigated and reported on allegations that Mexico was deeply Imbedded 
In Communist Ideology.
The State Department heard frightening accusations from Its 
representatives In Mexico. The department’s Interest seems to have
125The New York Times, Nov. 11, 1920, p. 17.
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begun about the time it received a request in early 1920 from J. Edgar 
Hoover, then assistant to the Attorney General. Hoover asked the State 
Department to look into the activities of a Russian agent accused of 
carrying on radical activities In Mexico.
An unidentifiable report to the Secretary of State on April 13,
1921, claimed there was a secret Canmunist Provisional Goverrment in 
Mexico in addition to the government of Alvaro O b r e g o n . I h i s  
Provisional Government supposedly had an alliance with Japan, had 
developed a seven pound gas bomb more deadly than any weapon previously 
known, had control of a Red Army, and had the ability to overthrow
y. 1 PRGeneral Obregon within twenty-four h o u r s . T h e  report also detailed 
a plot by liberal United States newspapers to publish propaganda against 
United States intervention in Mexican internal affairs should such a 
revolt take place. It named as leading Ccmmunists in Ffexico: Celestino
Gasca, military governor of the Federal District; Luis Morones, director 
of munitions and Pkxlcan national factories; General Plutarco E. Calles, 
former minslter of war, then minister of government; Adolfo de la Huerta, 
minsiter of finance; and several other prominent Mexicans, Doubtless, 
any move by Obregon to eliminate these men would have made the Mexican 
President a very lonely man at the top.
g. 59  ̂8l2.00B/b, Secretary of State to Attorney General, 
April 11, 1920.
^^^R. G. 59» 812.GOB, April 13, 1921. Although this document is 
not identified on the National Archives microfilm series, the date and 
contents relate closely to other memoranda written by Consul Claude 
Dawson to Charge George Summerlin In Mexico.
2̂®Ibld.
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Aside from fears of Communist propaganda circulating in the United 
States through seme sinister plot, numerous charges were made against 
General, and later President, Plutarco Ellas C a l l e s . G e o r g e  T. 
Summerlin, United States Char^ in Mexico, declared that General Calles 
was attenuating to set up a Soviet government in Mexico.
A Mexican newspaper named Omega stated that General Obregon showed 
fear of the Bolsheviks directed by General Calles, but it was nearly 
impossible for Obregon to disassociate himself because of "psychotic" 
tendencies. On January 29, 1923, Consul General Claude Dawson 
in Mexico City wrote to the Secretary of State informing him that *a 
leading IVfexican Red’, Luis Morones, was in Europe seeking to colla­
borate with Moscow in fostering "radicalism in the United States 
through Mexico." Consul Dawson indicated that General Calles headed 
a IVfexican Bolshevik movement and would make ’direct contact with 
Russian bolshevist leaders and ... foment the propaganda and replenish 
the Russo-JVfexican-Americanexchequer’ allegedly supervised by J. J.
Sanchez, former governor of the State of Puebla. Sanchez was known
132in Mexico as a Russian ’Red’ agent according to Dawson’s report. 
Governor Sanchez later denounced Commmism. Arriving in New
129pQp information of propaganda plots see R. G. 59, 812.00B/2,
/4, /9, /lO, /II, and 812.00211/9, /lO.
^^^R. G. 59, 812.00/25708, George Summerlin to Matthew Hanna 
(chief of division of Mexican Affairs, Department of State), May 30,
1922.
131R. G. 812.OOB/2, Summerlin to Secretary of State, Aug. 25, 1920. 
G. 812.20211.2, Claude Dawson to Secretary of State, Jan. 29,
1924.
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York for a meeting with Samuel Gctnpers, he said Comrnmlsm was "no 
good for America, no good for Mexico." He had Just returned from Russia 
where he was denied an audience with Lenin, although he did manage to 
meet Trotsky. Governor Sachez said he would report that Mexican 
workers should ally with American labor rather than with the Communists.
Although there Is little evidence available to support Dawson’s 
accusations, the climate of fearsbout radicalism In the United States 
during the early 1920’s gave officials some reason to suspect the 
Influence of Cannanlsm in Mexico. While the State Department gathered 
such evidence to support policy making decisions, the Mexicans capi­
talized upon the 'Red Scare’ in the United States to manipulate public 
opinion In that country. Newspapers quoted a ’high Mexican official’ 
as stating that Mexico needed Inmedlate United States recogiltlcn in 
order to put down Bolshevism. He said agitators could use the oil 
conflict to attack the government and force It Into a ccrapranlse with 
radicals. That CŒipranlse would work against foreign investments. The 
discontent over the high cost of living had also opened the way for a 
greater acceptance of Communism, according to the unnamed official. He 
said United States Investment capital could prevent the Communist
take-over, but Mexico would surely become the Russian Soviet of America
1^4If that assistance did not come soon. An editorial In The New York 
Times denounced that revelation as typical of the poor threat policy 
employed by Germany right after World War I. The newspaper Indicated
^^& e w  York Times, Sept. l6, 1922, p. 17. 
^^^Ibld., Nov. 13, 1920, p. 1.
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that Obregon could not have sanctioned the official *s coirment as 
Obregon was "too Intelligent to think that Mexico [could] be served or 
the United States scared In that
Obregon persisted In his opposition to Communism, and he continu­
ally spoke of his determination to rid ftexlco of the Bolshevik move­
ment. Foreign doctrines opposed to Mexican law were not allowed. 
American officials expected Obregon to take firm measures against the 
Canmunlsts, and he promised to do just that. Obregon said he would use 
the entire military to put down the Bolsheviks If necessary. To the 
Mexican leader the Cannunlsts were "false friends who would save Mexico 
by a revolution of the proletariat."^37 obregon's view of government 
denied the necessity of further violent change In Mexico.
When several State legislatures In the United States recommended 
that the United States recognize Obregon In mld-1921, the National 
Association for the Protection of American Rights In ffexlco protested. 
NAPARM Issued a statement which claimed,"... unless the Mexican Govern­
ment Is brought back to a sound policy In Its foreign relations. It Is 
very probable that the rising tide of Bolshevism will Inundate all 
M e x i c o . T h e  organization wanted a settlement on land and petrole­
um claims and guarantees against confiscation.
Obregon actually had greater control over Mexico than any President
^^^The New York Times. Nov. 15, 1920, p. l4. 
^3^Ibid., April 3, 1921, p. 7.
^̂ '̂ Ibld., Nov. 21, 1920, p. 12.
^^^Ibld., June 9, 1921, p. 4.
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since Porflrio p£az. Although seme agitation did occur, especially In 
Yucatan, military and civil authorities generally quashed revolts rapid­
ly. Communists were arrested in Mexico City, and a Russian deported. 
In addition, an agitator from the United States was denied permission 
to enter Mexico. Hie Mexicans put the agitator on the first boat 
sailing back to New York.^^^ Whatever Ccmrnunlst threat there may have 
been In Mexico going Into 1923 j Obregon possessed the power and used it 
against those vdio refused to adhere to Mexican nationalism and the law 
established by the 1917 Constitution.
In March, 1923, Obregon*s Minister of Foreign Relations Alberto 
Panl approached George T. Sunmerlln with nevra that Obregon wanted to 
settle the land and oil problem. Minister Pan! said President Obregon 
would seek indemnification for Americans who lost property to confisca­
tions under Article 27. Ife also cited settlement of problems concern­
ing the national debt under the Lamont De la Huerta agreement of June 
l6, 1922, and decisions by the Mexican Supreme Court vdilch denied retro­
active application of Article 27 in cases vfliere oil ccxipanles had acccm- 
plished * positive acts* to show their intent to use the petroleum pro- 
perltes.
Thcraas W. Lamont, the famous banker associated with J. P. Morgan, 
paved the way for agreements between Mexico and the United States. He 
refused to believe Ideological barriers separated the two countries. 
Instead, economic Issues represented the real problem in Lamont *s
^^^For revolts in Yucat^ see The New York limes, July 23, 1921, 
p. 14; July 9, 1922, p. 13; July 31, 1922, p. 28.
140The New York Times. July 9, 1922, II, p. 1.
141Callahan, American Foreign Policy, p. 592.
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opinion. In 1922 he told fellow businessmen that Obregon*s cabinet 
members were not members of the Third International as he had been 
told by the British Intelligence Office. Though they were "somewhat 
radical, they were not at all Bolshevistic or anarchistic." Lamont 
spread the word that Mexico *s problem was not radicalism but poor 
organization.-^ The International Ccranittee of Bankers, vÆiich La­
mont headed, therefore ettphasized 'quiet, patient negotiations' as 
opposed to the 'bluster and threats of the oilmen. '^^3
The apparent air of increased trust led to the Bucareli Conference. 
The Conference produced two tangible agreements: a general claims
convention and a special claims convention. Additionally, seme "Extra- 
official Pact" emanated fhcm the Meeting. The general claims conven­
tion covered all United States claims against Mexico since 1868 while 
the special claims convention treated United States claims growing out 
of the Revolution. Americans accepted bonds instead of cash for hacien 
da lands taken for redistribution on condition that IVfexico expropriate 
only limited lands for ejidos, or conmunal agrarian settlements. The 
Extra-official Pact revolved around Article 27. The Mexicans maintained 
the doctrine of "positive acts." Oil properties acquired legally 
between 1976 and 1917 were to remain perpetually in the purchasers' 
hands without requiring a drilling license as long as scxne proof of 
exploitation was evident. Both governments released news of the agree- 
ment on August 31, 1923.
1 jipSmith, Revolutionary Nationalism, pp. 213-124, taken from "Remarks 
before the Dutch Treat Club, Lincoln, March l4, 1922."
^^%obert Freeman anith,"The Ponnation and Development of the Interna­
tional Bankers Committee on Mexico," Journal of Economic History, XXIII 
(Dec. 1963), p. 586.
l^^Cline, The United States and Mexico, pp. 207-208.
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'W»e substance of the discontent did not end with Bucareli. Tlie 
claims comnission actually met in 1924, but without success. Not until 
the 1930 *s did the two countries agree on claims settlements which were 
ratified by both Senates. When Plutarco Elias Calles became President, 
he disowned the agreement on Article 27. Obregon was under pressure to 
obtain IMited States recognition, and the unofficial nature of the pact 
made it non—binding on later Presidents.
Obregon gained official recognition from the United States after 
the conference. That recognition proved valuable a short time later 
when Adolfo de la Huerta revolted against the government as Obregon 
supported Calles for the Presidental election. Obregon was successful 
largely because of aid from the United States. Military siç>plies and 
cooperation along the United States border helped Obregon defeat the 
former Provisional President.
The Mexican Communist Party backed De la Huerta at the beginning of 
the campaign but switched to Calles and Obregon when Bertram Wolfe 
convinced the Party that De la Huerta represented the reactionary 
e l e m e n t s . De la Huerta appeared to uphold that contention when he 
c^tured Yucatan and sent the radical Felipe Carrillo into retreat.
The New York Times listed the Yucatan event as a defeat for the "lead­
ing exponent of Communism in Mexico." Americans in the region trusted 
the new De la Huerta government as its first act was to outlaw the sale
^ ^ciine. The United States and Mexico, p.,208. See also Manuel 
Machado, "The United States and the De la Huerta Rebellion," Southwestern 
Quartarly (January 1972), pp. 303-325*
^Alexander, Ccnrounism, pp. 322—323. See also The New York Times, 
April 6, 1924, p. 12.
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lU7of liquor in the region, according to the news account. ' De la 
Huerta did not hold power long in Yucat^, however, as he soon lost to 
Otxregon-Calles troops.
Calles entered his first year as President with well-wishes from 
United States Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes. Hie cordial rela­
tionship between the two governments did not last long as Calles in 
December, 1925, decided to favor retroactive application of Article 27 
despite the Bucareli agreaænt. The Mexican Congress established a 
new law vAiereby old leases had to be exchanged for new fifty year leases
n h Oif foreigners wanted to hold their Mexican acquisitions at all.
Popular pressure did much to force the Calles government into the new 
position, but he was probably less hesitant to take action after tense 
diplomatic exchanges between the two countries.
President Calles did not get along well with Ambassador to Mexico
James R. Sheffield and the new Secretary of State, Prank B. Kellogg. 
Sheffield, representing the United States in Mexico since 1924, 
received his information from anti-Calles conservatives and favored 
American Investors. Kellogg, basing his knowledge of Mexico largely 
on information from Ambassador Sheffield, suggested in June 1924 that 
Mexico relax its new agrarian policy which called for foreigners to 
sell shares in land holdings in order to give Mexicans controlling 
interest. Kellogg further asked that confiscated lands be returned.
He added in his statement to the press, " ... Mexico is now on trial
^^^The New York Times, Dec. 17, 1923» P* 1- 
^^^Callahan, American Foreign Policy, p. 597.
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before the world." Secretary Kellogg claimed further that the Calles 
Government was responsible for protecting Americans in Mexico.
President Calles indignantly replied that Mexico was no more on 
trial than any other country. Including the United States. Both 
exchanges came through press releases rather than regular dlplcanatlc 
channels. Resentment increased on both sides when Chargé d’Affaires 
E. F. Arthur Schoenfeld was kept waiting on a visit to Calles, and 
Mexican Ambassador Manuel Tellez received a lecture at the State Depart 
ment on Mexican obligations and the correctness of Secretary Kellogg's 
statement. There was no* way to determine the effect on Calles, but 
the incident very likely was still on his mind when Mexico passed the 
December, 1925, petroleum and land law. With the added controversy of 
that law, relationships between Mexico and the United States remained 
under stress until 1927 after a peak of crisis over United States inter­
vention in Nicaragua.
While Mexican relations with the United States deteriorated, 
I'fexican—Soviet ties strengthened during President Calles ' first few 
years in office. Obregon had established diplcmatic relations with 
the Soviets after the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared on 
July 30, 1924, that Mexico recognized the right of each country to 
select its own form of government. On November 7, Stanislas Pestkovsky
/ 1 Clpresented his credentials to President Obregon.
Ethan Ellis, Frank B. Kellogg and American Foreign Relations, 
1925-1929 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1961),
pp. 27—26.
^^Ojbid., p. 28.
^^^Clissold,^olvet Relations. p. 4.
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The Soviets were overly-enthuslastlc about their diplcsnatic success 
in Mexico. The Soviet Foreign Minister G. V. Chicherin announced that 
Mexico would be a base for further operations in the Americas. Presi­
dent Calles, who had replaced Obregon, respcxided bluntly by stating 
that the Soviet Legation would have to respect both Mexico’s sovereignty 
and international law.^^^ Thus, the Soviet Union made its first blunder 
shortly after her first minister to Mexico, Pestkovsky, stepped on 
Mexican soli.
Pestkovsky made sane of his own mistakes. His first was to criti­
cize CRCM, the official labor organization, and Luis Morones, its head. 
Morones no longer associated himself with the Communist cause. From 
his position in President Calles’ cabinet, Morones conducted constant 
verbal attacks on both the Ccmnunists and the Soviet goverrment. 
Pestkovsky further angered the Mexican government by his obvious 
role in the formation of numerous Ccranunlst-front organizations.
Among such organizations formed were Priaids of Soviet Russia, the Anti-
153Inperialist League, and the Young Comnunlets.
Any hope for reconcilliaticn between the Mexican and Soviet 
governments was further diminished by the latter ’ s involvement in the 
1924-1925 railroad strike. When Communist -supported rail workers 
decided to go on strike, CROM decided that it would be an opportunity 
to take control of rail operations since the striking laborers had
152Carleton Beals, The Coming St^ggle for Latin American 
(new York; J. B. Lippincott Col, 193B)7p * 136.
153^^Ibid., pp. 137-138.
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earlier refused to Join the more conservative official labor party. 
Strikers received over fifty thousand pesos ($25,000) that had come 
from Soviet Russia. Knowing that the Soviet Government had to approve
l̂ lithis arrangement, Calles and his government protested. In 1926 
Pestkovsky was headed toward home, replaced by the new Soviet Minister 
Madame Kollontay.
One of the principal reasons President Calles had protested 
Chicherin *s remarks at the opening of Mexican-Soviet diplomatic rela­
tions was the Mexican President’s awareness of American allegations 
of Bolshevism In M e x i c o . C a l l e s  himself had been accused of being 
a Comnunlst even before he replaced President Obregœ. One such 
accusation came from Senator Reed Smoot of Utah.
Senator Smoot denounced Calles In a letter to Secretary of State 
Charles Evans Hughes in January, 1924. He wrote that:
. . . our State Department Is in the curious position 
of denying recognition to Russia vrtille at the same time 
giving support to Calles, who Is a much redder Bolshevist 
than Lenin ever was and who claims to have communistic Ideas 
that are a great improvement, from the communistic point of 
view,.oyer anything that Laaln advocated even In his reddestd a y s . ^ 5 6
In the same letter Senator Smoot said he had Information from two 
banker friends in Mexico City vho claimed Cbregm had gone Insane, and 
that Calles ran the government. Humes’ reply stated that Obregon 
was known to be In full possession of his faculties, but he did not
l̂ liBeals, The Coming Struggle .p. 138.
^^^Cllssold, Soviet Relations, p. 4.
^^^R. G. 59, 812.op/26711, Senator Reed Smoot (Utah) to Sec. of 
State Charles E. Hughes, Jan. 3, 1924.
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mention Calles.
In 1925 r^orts were still caning into the State Department 
concerning President Calles and his alleged associations with Comnu- 
nism. The American Consulate in San Luis Potosf offered * proof ' that 
Calles believed wonen to be public property, a belief frequently 
associated with Bolshevism in those days. According to a Consulate 
official, an American friend in San Luis Potosf had gone with a 
Mexican known by Calles, to ask the IVfexican President:
. . .  in accordance with Spanish customs, for permission 
to marry his dau^ter. President Calles told the American 
that he did not believe in marriage and that the Am^ican 
could live with his daughter if he cared to do so.^^°
While sane persons reported to the State Department that Calles
was a Communist, at least one Department representative in Mexico
disagreed. On September 10, 1925 > Charge H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld wrote
the Secretary of State that President Calles was not giving any active
aid or support to the Communists or their propaganda movements in
Mexico. In spite of all the directives coming from Moscow, there were
few people in Mexico viio would listen to anyone who received orders
from a foreign power. Mexican nationalism was too strong according to
Charge Schoenfeld.
^  the end of 1925 Mexican'-United States relations were seemingly
G. 59, 812.00/26711, Senator Reed Smoot (Utah) to Sec. of 
State Charles E. Hughes, Jan. 3, 1924.
^^^R. G. 59, 812.OOB/IO6, Dan Haver (Consul at San Luis Potosf) 
to Sec. of State, Dec. 31, 1925.
G. 59, 812.0013/95, Charge H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld to Sec. 
of State, Sept. 10, 1925.
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at a low point. Americans with Investments in Mexico were angered 
over Galles’ refusal to abide by the non-retroactlve application of 
Article 27 as had been agreed upon at Bucareli. President Coolidge 
paid little attention to Mexico, but his Secretary of State and Arribas- 
sador to Mexico generally favored the capitalist investors and a fiim 
attitude toward Mexico. Though the real issue was over Mexico’s at- 
tenopt to assert her sovereignty at Americans* expense, it was confused 
by those added charges of Bolshevism that IXfexico so vehemently denied. 
Relations ebbed even lower viien the United States used those allegations 
of Mexican Bolshevism to justify intervention in Nicaragua in 1926.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER V 
CONFLICT OVER NICARAGUA: 1926-1927
Althougjx officials In the State Department heard many charges 
of active Bolshevism In Mexico prior to 1926, those charges never led 
to direct action. In 1927» however, the State Department justified 
its Invasion of Nicaragua by United States Marines by expressed fear 
of the forceful spread of Mexican Coiinunlsm- The action put United 
States-^Mexlcan relations Into a tense state complicated by hl#i pres­
sure frcm American Investors and churchmen. Mexico and the United 
States asserted their sovereign powers and exchanged hostile views 
amid popular discussion of Impending war.
In 1926 oil and land reamlned at the base of the conflict between 
Mexico and the United States. The State Department maintained Its 
antagonistic view of Mexico*s December 1925 Petroleum and Allen Land 
Laws. Ambassador Sheffield and Charge H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld suppor­
ted American Investors vftio looked at Mexican law as confiscatory. Al­
though Secretary Kellogg was reluctant, his two representatives sought 
a confrontation to produce seme definite settlement. They did not 
seek war, but they did not totally eliminate that option.
The hardliners pushing for firm action against Mexico, received 
support from the Catholic Church In the United States when a dispute 
erupted between the Church and the Mexican Government In 1926. The
^^^Smlth, Revolutionary Nationalism, p. 235*
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Mexican Archbishop made the mistake of publishing a protest against the 
Mexican Constitution and some of Its anticlerical measures. President 
Galles took It as a challenge and ordered those constitutional measures 
Into effect as the Government had Ignored them to that point. To 
protest the nationalization of Church property and the expulsion of 
foreign clerics, Mexican bishops ordered a strike of the clergy, 
jyfexlcans were without religious services.
Although the majority of Mexicans were Catholics, they generally 
did not feel the need for priests. 'Parlshoners kept the Churches open 
under orders from the government ) Although some staunch supporters of 
the Church went Into open rebellion, the masses adhered to their 
govemmait’s policy. Church opposition lasted until 1929 When a com- 
promise ended the crisis on terms mostly unfavorable to the Catholics.
In the course of the struggle between Church and State In Mexi­
co, American hardliners found added support for their contentions of 
Mexican radicalism. The Supreme Council of the Khl^ts of Columbus wrote 
to the State Department asking for war against Galles to prevent reali­
zation of his allegedly radical alms.^^^ Churchmen called President
Galles an outright Bolshevik and declared the real struggle in Mexico
l6l|was a religious one between Christian Civilization and Bolshevism.
^^^Alba, The Mexicans, p. 160.
^^%or a detailed account of the feud between Church and State In 
Mexico during the revolution see John W. F. Dulles, Yesterday In lyfexlco: 
A Chronicle of the Revolution, 1919-1936 (Austin: University of Texas
1961), passim.
^^^The New York Times, August 6, 1926, p. 1.
^^^Ibld., August 14, 1926, p. 4 and Nov. 24, 1926, p. 11.
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Here again Galles’ adversaries did not recognize the nationalistic 
direction of the 1917 Constitution and the Mexican government. The 
Catholic Church, besides having its titular head outside Mexico, relied 
heavily on foreign priests and continued to symbolize the Spanish pre­
sence in Mexican life. Mexicans resented those vflio spoke for outsiders 
rather than for IVtexicans, and scores of priests had to leave the country 
under the new Constitution. Sane Americans in the State Department 
used that misunderstanding to rally support for a firmer United States 
policy toward kfexico.
Although oil representatives wanted support, they rejected the re­
ligious question because of its inpracticality. Guy Stevens, a leading 
spoksman for oil Interests, clarified his constituents’ view. He 
denounced opposition to United States protests against Mexico’s land 
use laws as coming from Comnunists vrtio wanted an end to private pro­
perty. On the religious controversy he said;
. . . articles and statements I have read have indicated to me 
that there is in not a few minds a prejudice so deep against 
the Catholic Church that some people would almost be willing 
to see the institution of private property destroyed if only 
the Catholic Chruch would go down in the same crash. It has 
always seemed to me exceedingly unfortuante that a multitude 
of unrelated questions should have to be thrown together, to 
the general confusion of the whole Mexican situation.
Stevens obviously feared that his cause could be hurt by the Church 
issue and therefore backed away. He was still willing to use the ac­
cusation of Communism against his opposition, however. It was indeed 
unfortunate that "a multitude of unrelated questions" should add to 
the confusion United States-Mexican affairs.
^^%uy Stevens, Current Controversies with Mexico (n.p., 1927),
pp. 122-200.
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The State Department used charges of Bolshevism in Mexico, how­
ever, not to justify intervention in Mexico but in Nicaragua! Ameri­
can intervention in Nicaragua was a complicated maneuver to restore 
stable government to that country so American investments and lives 
would not be harmed. The American presence suggested nothing new as 
the United States had kept order with, troops there from 1912 to 1924. 
Ifexico's involvement was new, however, and drew rounds of criticism frcm 
the Coolidge administration.
The problems in Nicaragua grew out of the 1924 Presidential elec­
tion there. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes wanted a free 
election so American Marines could be removed. Carlos Solorzano, a 
Conservative, won the Presidential position on a ticket with Liberal 
Juan Bautista Sacasa as vice-president. The outgoing Conservative gov­
ernment supported Solorzano and Sacasa because of a split within the 
Conservative ranks. Another faction of Conservatives ran Emiliano 
Chamorro. With the election over. Marines stayed on to insure order 
until the government called them heme in August, 1925.^^^
The Conservative Chamorro disapproved of the Liberal influence 
in Solorzano’s government. On October 25, 1925, Chamorro led a coup 
d'etat vÆiich forced Solorzano to give Chamorro comnand of the army as 
general-in-chief. While the President officially remined in office, 
Chamorro held actual power. The revolt stopped short of overthrowing 
Solorzano as the United States had pledged in a 1923 Central American
William Kaitman, A Search for Stability: United States Dipl^
macy Toward Nicaragua 1925-1933 (South Bend/ Indiana, 1968), pp. 26-29. 
Hereafter cited Kamman, Search.
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treaty to withhold recognition from any government coming to power by 
unconstitutional means. The revolt did, however, effectively elimi­
nate Liberal influence in the government as Chamorro had the Congress 
expel liberal menbers, and Vice-President Sacasa fled to El Salvador 
on his way to Washington to plead for assistance.
Under Chamorro’s control, the Nicaraguan Congress banished Sacasa 
for two years and opened his office to Chamorro who, according to the 
Nicaraguan Constitution, illegally received a senatorial seat viiile 
serving as general-in-chief of the army. In January, 1926, Solorzano 
broke under the pressure of the situation, became ill, resigned and 
left the country. Chamorro therefore became President.
The United States refused to recognize Chamorro even though he 
had the backing of American businessmen. IMder a 1923 treaty with 
Nicaragua, the United States refused to recognize anyone who came to 
power illegally through violence or otherwise. The United States 
negotiated with Chamorro to get his resignation and a new Congressional 
appointee for President. Adolfo Diaz, the new President, received 
United States recognition on November 17, 1926, because the Nicaraguan 
Congress asked the formerly expelled liberal members to rejoin it.^^^ 
The Liberals did not accept the arrangement and fought on. They
^^ K̂attroan, Search, pp. 42-46.
^^^Ibid., p. 48.
^^^Dana Nunro, The Lat^ American Republics: A History (New York:
D. Appleton-Century Col, 1942), p. 504.
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170denied that the Congress had beai legally reconstituted. According 
to Article 106 of* the Nicaraguan Constitution the Congress could select 
a person to entrust with the Presidency if neither the elected Presi­
dent or Vice-President was in the country, Mexico claimed that the 
Nicaraguan Congress had never been restored to its legal form as it 
had existed before Chamorro's take-over. Sacasa claimed he had never 
abdicated except by that force with which the Conservatives » now under 
Diaz, took control. The United States claimed otherwise and gave finan­
cial aid to the new DjLaz government while placing an oribargo on arms
171to both factions. The Liberals held ground only with Mexican support.
The United States was well aware of Mexico's military aid to 
Sacasa. Both countries claimed they were supporting the legal govern­
ment in Nicaragua. Americans landed Marines in August to protect 
investments and lives by forming a neutral zone while Mexico continued 
to ship arms to the Liberals. A full force of Marines landed on 
Deconber 24 to side with the Conservatives in keeping order. On 
January 10, 1927 President Coolidge appeared before Congress to condemn 
Mexico for not adhering to the embargo. Shortly thereafter the 
President lifted the embargo to give aims to the Conservative Dfaz.
lAiable to convert Mexico to its view of the Nicaraguan situation
^70por the controversy over Article 106 of Nicaraguan Constitution 
and whether or not the Nicaraguan Congress was restored to its legal 
components see Kamman, Search, p. 67, and Henry L. Stirascwi, American 
Policy in Nicaragua (New York; Charles Scribner's Sons, 192?), p. 29. 
Stimson's work hereafter cited as Stimscn, American Policy.
171Stimson, American Policy, p. 26.
172Ibid., p. 34.
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as related to law, the Coolidge administration sought more popular 
support for its policy at heme. Already in November, 1926, Under­
secretary of State Robert E. Olds had raised the cry of Mexican 
Bolshevik plotting. Calling a number of pressmen to his office. Olds 
reported that Mexico was trying to spread Bolshevism throughout Central 
America as a threat to United States influence and control of the 
Panama Canal.
Trying to draw further support for a stricter policy toward Mexico, 
Undersecretary Olds said:
For more than a year the State Department had been 
concerned over the relations between the United States and 
Mexico, and those relations had now reached a very acute stage.
It is an undeniable fact that the Mexican Government to-day 
is a Bolshevist government. We can not prove it, but we are 
morally certain that a wann bond of sympathy, if not ^.actual 
understanding, exists between Mexico City and Moscow.^'^
Olds set the stage for a clearer definition of Mexican Bolshevism that
was to follow.
President Coolidge went before the Senate on January 10, 1927, to 
Justify using Marines in Nicaragua. He encountered Senatorial opposi­
tion, but that opposition waited to present its case until Secretary of 
State Kellogg could appear at a previously scheduled hearing of the 
Foreign Relations Committee. Senator George Norris of Nebraska added 
that he hoped Senators could take sides in the Nicaraguan question as
U n i t e d  States, Congress, Senate, Senator Robert LaFollette 
quoting fron Nov. 27, 1926 issue of St. Louis Post Dispatch, 69th 
congress, 2nd session, Jan. l4, 1927» Congressional Record, 68, pt, 
2, p. 1646.
174,Ibid.
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their consciences would dictate without being called Bolsheviks. News­
papers, Senators, and citizens waited for Secretary Kellogg to make an 
explanation on January 12.
Seme Senators were shocked when Secretary Kellogg finally explained 
American Intervention In the tiny Latin American republic. The Secre­
tary did not suggest protection of American lives and coital. In­
stead, he told of the administrations desire to prevent Mexico frcm 
establishing a Communist government in Nicaragua. To prove his point, 
Kellogg offered the following Information: 1) a resolution of the third
congress of the Red International of Trade Unions, July 8 to 22, 1924, 
which called upon workers to unite against American Imperialism; 2) a 
speech before the Executive Ccmmlttee of the Communist International 
February 4, 1926, which called the American Ccmraunist Party "defender 
of the oppressed peoples of Latin America;" 3) a Conlntem thesis that 
"Latin America can and must became a basis of support against imperial­
ism;" 4) the March, 1926, Instructions to the American Communist Party 
to keep In touch with the Latin American labor moverænt; 5) a report to 
the American Ccranunists that "direct contact with Ffexlco was maintained;" 
6) reports on activities and plans of American Communists dated 
November 1926; 7) a quote from Soviet Foreign Minister Chlcherln on 
using Mexico as a base for extending contacts In Latin America; 8) a 
speech In the Mexican Chamber of Deputies condemning Moscow for trying 
to embroil Mexico in a conflict with the United States; 9) a protest 
from the Mexican Regional Confederation of Laborers condemning
175u, S., congress. Senate, Senator Norris speaking on Nicaraguan 
Intervention, 69th Cong., 2nd sess., Jan. 10, 1927, Congresslonal 
Record, vol. 68, pt. 2, pp. 1330-1331.
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Ambassador Pe;st kovsky's aid to radical groups in Mexicoj and finally, 
10) a resolution from CRCM asking the Mexican government to break off 
diplomatic relaticxis with the Soviet Union because the Soviets had 
aided Mexico's internal e n e m i e s . I h e  New York Wqrld. after citing 
Secretary Kellogg's informâtioi> stated the following:
Ihus far Mr. Kellogg has not cited one single Mexican 
document, official or otherwise. All this evidence consists 
glmply in the statements by Russians in Moscow or Americans in 
Chicago as to what they would like to do in Mexico.
We come at the end to three documents by^Mexicans:
A. Speech by Mexican Labor Deputy Trevino in the 
Mexican Chamber of Deputies on September 9. 1925. He denounces 
the communists In Moscow for trying to provoke 'an international 
conflict' with the United States.
B. Communication addressed to the soviet minister by the
central committee of the Mexican Federation of Labor, by direc­
tion of the seventh congress of that organization. It tells 
him to keep his hands off Mexico, because 'no nation has the 
right to impose, nor to lay down for another the doctrine 
which must control its activities.'
C. Resolution adopted March 6, 1926, at the seventh 
annual convention of the Mexican Federation of Labor, asking 
the diplomatic representative of Russia to 'abstain from 
lending moral and economic support to the so-called radical 
group enemies of the Mexican Federation of Labor and of the 
government.'
On analysis. Secretary Kellogg's charges against Mexico 
collapse igncminously. His own citations prove, first, that 
he has no evidence connecting the Mexican Government with the 
Communist International at Moscow, and second, that even 
Mexican labor has openly resisted caimunist activity. '*
Senator Robert M. LaFollette severely criticized Kellogg's
raticnale. Claiming that the Secretary of State had deliberately
hoped to play upon fears already created, LaFollette denounced the
Secretary's sensationalism. He then proceeded to refute Kellogg's
S. Congress, Senate, 69th cong., 2nd sess., Jan 1^, 1927, 
Congressional Record, 68, pt. 2, p. l647*
177Ibid.
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statement. Nothing in the statement connected the Mexican government 
to international Communism. In at least one charge Secretary Kellogg 
had failed to give the entire truth. He did not give President Galles* 
reply to Soviet Minister Chicherin, and that reply was highly pertinent. 
Galles told the Soviets they were not to meddle in Mexican matters of 
sovereignty. The Mexicans, according to their President, based their 
doctrine on "their own sufferings and experiences and rejected foreign 
interference. ** Senator LaFollette implied that Secretary Kellogg was 
aware of Galles* response and deliberately sought to mislead the Senate 
and American citizens.
Secretary Kellogg* s January statement drew criticism not only from 
American polit leans and newspapers, but also from Soviet Gomnisar Maksim 
Litvinov. Litvinov commented as follows;
Statesmen of capitalist countries have recently acquired 
the habit of excusing their incapacity in internal affairs or 
their agressive designs in foreign affairs by reference to Bol­
shevik machinations and the plots of the Soviet Government.
Whether it is a question of the strike in England, or of the 
American fleet * s raid on the independent State of Nicaragua, 
or the shooting of the citizens of Java and Sumatra by Dutch 
police— there is always the same excuse: the plots of the
Bolshevik Government. I shall not be surprised if enli^tened 
statesmen of the great Powers begin to ascribe to the machina­
tions of the Bolsheviks the earthquake in Japan and the floods 
in America. To attenpt a serious refutation of these f^tas- 
tic explanations would be an Insult to public opinion.^'^
He added that to Justify intervention with Marines in Nicaragua by
quoting the resolutions of the Third International was as ludicrous
as it would be for the Soviet Union to attribute bad harvests in
S. Congress, Senate, 69th Gong., 2nd sess., Jan. l4, 1927, 
Gongiessional Record, 68, pt. 2, p. 1648.
^^%ane Degras, ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy 1925-1932 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1952), II, p. 152.
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Russia to machinations of the American Federation of Labor vflilch made 
malicious resolutions concerning the Soviets. Ihe Soviets, too, 
opposed Kellogg*s tenuous logic.
Seme members of the United States Senate opposed the landing of 
Marines In Nicaragua. Among these were Senators William Borah and 
Burton K. Wheeler. Senator Wheeler Introduced a resolution to remove 
the United States forces, but the action received little Senatorial 
support. Senator Wheeler claimed there was no Communist plot In 
Nicaragua, but the Marines remained.
With lAiited States aid, the Conservative DÏaz was able to hold 
power in Nicaragua. In Mexico, where popular opinion favored Juan 
Sacasa as legal President of Nicaragua, rfexlco City dally El Excelsior 
carrmented on the United States actions. It claimed Mexico had as much 
right as the United States to supply aid to legitimate governments in 
Latin America. It accused the President of the United States of having
T Q Oflexible moral principles. Whatever accusations Mexico ml^nt throw, 
the United States had the military power. The United States dictated 
the rulershlp In Nicaragua under the pretense that It was preventing 
Mexico from spreading Communism In Latin America.
At the hel#it of tension over the Nicaraguan crisis, Henry Lane 
Wilson, former United States Ambassador to Mexico, sent a note to 
the Postmaster General asking that It be revealed to Secretary of
l^^Degras, Soviet Documents, p. 513. 
181,Kamman, Search, p. 77.
'James Wilkie and Alber ____________ ___________
of Upheaval 1910-1940 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 139.
T OpJa t Michaels, Revolution In Mexico: Years
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State Kellogg. Wilson recalled that Galles at one time, either under 
Carranza or Obregon, had declared himself a Bolshevik, He further 
stated that President Coolidge should not take attacks on his Nicaraguan 
policy seriously as the Americans would follow him in the event of war, 
Mr, Wilson concluded, however, that war with IVfexlco would probably not 
be necessary. He said that If the United States withdrew recognition 
the Galles government would fall. Neither Goverranent was willing to 
go to war over the affair,
Ihe crltlclan of United States Involvement in Nicaragua hit a sar­
castic note in a poem read by Senator George Norris vftiich went as follows:
Onc*t they was a Bolshevik who wouldn’t say his prayers.
So Kellogg sent him off to bed, a w ^  up stairs;
An’ Kellogg heerd him holler, and Coolidge heerd him bawl.
But véîen they t u m ’t the klvers down he wasn’t there at all.
They seeked him down in Mexico, they cussed him in the press.
They seeked him ’round the Capitol, an’ ever’where I guess.
But all they ever found of him was whiskers, hair and Clgut;
An’ the Bolsheviks ’11 get you ef you don’t watch out,
Accusations of Bolshevism did not seem to arouse Americans as much as
they had in the earlier 1920’s, Newspaper and popular support for the
administration’s Nlcaragoan policy waned.
With continued fl#itlng in Nicaragua and active opposition at
home. President Coolidge sent Henry L, Stimson to Nicaragua to mediate
the argument in March, 1927. After viewing the situation, Sitmson
concluded that neither of the opposing factions could bring about a
G, 59, 8l2,001C13/24, Henry L, Wilson to Harry S. New 
(Postmaster General), Jna, 15, 1927.
1 giiU, S, Congress, Senate, Senator Norris read poem by James 
Whitcomb Riley, 69th Cong,, 2nd sess., 1927, Congressional Record, 68
pt. 2, p, 1691.
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decisive military victory. Tlhe upcoming 1928 election provided Stimson 
with a possible solution. If that election could be conducted impar­
tially, then both sides might accept the victor. President E)iaz 
accepted the idea and asked Stimson to propose the following conditions 
to the liberals ; 1) an end to hostilities before the new crop was
ready for planting with both sides to turn their arms over to American 
supervisors, 2} amnesty for exiles and return of their property, 3) 
Liberal participation in the Diaz cabinet, 4) formation of a nonpartisan 
police force commanded by American officers, 5) American supervision 
of tbe 1928 election with enough force available to be effective, and 
6) the continued existence of Marines to enforce stability. Stimson 
took those terms to Liberal representatives.
The Liberals arranged a meeting between Sitmson and their comman­
der in the field. General Moncada. Recognizing Moncada as generally 
favorable to United States influence in Central America, Stimson 
was anxious to confer with him. The American representative was not 
disappointed. It took the two only thirty minutes to agree on a 
proposed end to hostilities with the exception of Moncada*s opposi­
tion to Diaz remaining in the presidency. The Liberal general said 
he would try to convince his men, however, that it was necessary to 
accept Diaz until 1928 when the United States would guarantee a 
free election. Sacasa Himslef, thou^ not pleased with the outcome,
went along with his Générales decision. With the agreement, the Liber-
1 ftfial forces stopped fighting and received money for their weapons.
^^%timson, American Policy, pp. 63-64. 
^^^Ibid., pp. 76-84.
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One Liberal commander refused to accept the peace terms. General 
Auguste Cesar Sandino kept his guerrilla band together in the North.
From 1927 to 1933 Sandino harassed American troops and gained fame 
throughout Latin America as the defender of Nicaraguan sovereignty 
s^ainst United States imperialism. As unjustified as United States 
accusations were against the Sacasa revolt, they would have been 
slightly more apropos had they been applied to Sandino after began 
his own guerrilla war.
Fighting for the Liberal Party's cause, Sandino met with the 
Conlntem agents who hcped to guide him into their fold. Farabundo 
Mart£, a member of the League Against Imperialism, became Sandino's 
private secretary. The League Against Imperialism was secretly run 
by the Comintem and included the Mexican intellectual Jos^ Vasconcelos 
in Its list of delegates at its first meeting in February, 1927. 
CVanconcelos, like many others, very likely was unaware of the Conlntem*s 
control.) It was Farabundo Martf's job to win Sandino over to the Com­
munist cause.
To assist Sandino, the Communists established their own collection 
agency, "Mafunenic," to get funds to forward to Nicaragua. It did more 
harm than good as Sandino already had his own agents collecting outside 
Nicaragua. Sympathetic foreigners, confused by the two groups, gave 
hesitantly. When the Comnunists did get funds, only a small percentage 
made it to Sandino.
In 1929 Sandino broke off his relations with the Ccramunists.
^^^Alba, Politics and Labor, pp. 130-131. 
^^^Ibid., p. 132.
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Refusing to eliminate the intellectual and middle class as suggested by 
the Lea©ie Against Iirperialslm, Sandino dropped Farabundo Marti from his 
secretarial position. In an exchange of letters in January, 1930, San­
dino and the Secretary of the Mexican Communist Party formally rejected 
each, other's cause. Though the CcranDunlsts claimed Sandino was without 
moral principles, Farabundo Marti, his ex-secretary, confessed just be­
fore his execution for participation in a Communist-inspired revolt in 
El Salvador in 1931 that the break resulted frcm Sandino *s refusal to 
accept Ccmmunism. Just before Farabundo Marti was executed, he praised 
Sandino as a patriot of Nicaraguan sovereignty.^®^
The Sandino revolt lasted until 1933 vtfien the United States finally 
ccranitted itself to wlthdrawl of armed forces frcm Nicaragua. The new 
Nicaraguan President was Juan B. Sacasa for vfticm Sandino originally 
took to the field. President Sacasa gave Sandino amnesty and enployment 
to his followers as well as opening segments of public land to peasant 
settlement. Sandino did not keep his freedom long, however, as he 
was assassinated after a dinner given in his honor by President Sacasa 
in 1934. The alleged assassin was Brigadier General Anastasio Soraoza, 
a jealous rival for the Presidency. Nicaraguan politics seemed 
to have benefited little frcm American moral guidance.
The Nicaraguan interlude served only to put increased strain on 
United States-Mexican relations in early 1927 vdien the State Department
^Alba, Politics and Labor, p. 281. For exchange of letters be­
tween Sandino and the secretary of the IVfexican Ccarmunist Party see 
Clissold, Soviet Realtions, p. 15.
^^^Alexander DeConde, Herbert Hoover^s Latin American Policy 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1951), P SA.
^^^Dubois, Operation America, p. 24.
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made its charges against Mexican Bolshevism. At that time the Conmunists 
had less influence in jyfexican goverranent than they developed later with 
Sandino in Nicaragua. Fortunately, the hardliners failed to precipi­
tate war with. Mexico, but the possibility may have had seme impact on 
the Mexican government whicb became mca?e conciliatory toward the United 
States afterward. The argument that Wtexico was attempting to set up 
Bolshevik governments in Latin America to spread the concept of national­
izing foreign property did not work to gain popular support. United 
States’ willingness to use military force to back its interests, how­
ever, pleased those perscais with business interests who were advocating 
militant measures against IVfexico.̂ ^̂  United States intervention in 
Nicaragua nay have added immediate tension to relations with Mexico, 
but in the long run, it may have helped to break the ^parent stale­
mate in United States efforts to protect investanents under pressure 
frcm the mere radical articles of the 1917 Consittution in Mexico.
Both Coolidge and Galles ^parently wanted to prevent disagreements 
from leading to military action.
After the Nicaraguan conflict, both Mexico and the United States 
seemed to change their views toward a more conciliatory posture.
Symbolic of the changing atmosphere in United States-Mexican affairs 
was the appointment of Dwight Morrow as ambassador to Mexico in Septem­
ber, 1927. President Coolidge could not have picked a better man to 
help smooth over the disagreements that had plagued the two countries 
since the outbreak of the Mexican Revolution.
^^^anith, Revolutionary Nationalism, p. 24l.
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CHAPTER VI 
DIPLCMACY WITHOUT REDS UNDER IHE BED
Even before Dtsdght Morrow’s appointment as United States Ambas­
sador to Mexico in 1927, a number of factors helped ease tensions be­
tween the r£o Grande neighbors. Nearly a decade had elapsed since the 
Ccranunist take-over in Russia, and the State Department officials seemed 
less willing to eaiphasize the Bolshevik plot in United States-Mexican 
relations. That was especially true because of Secretary Kellogg's 
failure to arouse popular support with that accusation in the Nicara­
guan cirsis. Despite the discomfiture of oil company representatives 
over the Mexican inpleraentation of Article 27 and the new law ordering 
fifty year leases to replace the old perpetual ones, they agreed with 
Secretary Kellogg in August, 1927, that intervention was not the solu­
tion. An apparent shift in State DeparWent attitude may have fright­
ened the oilmen. J. Reuben Clark, Jr., representing the Department, 
denied the confiscatory nature of Mtexican law and refuted claims by 
oil companies. He declared that no.confiscation had taken place, but 
should that occur the oil people would have to content themselves with 
claims for damages against the Mexican government. Tension between 
the two countries also eased as Mexico sought to recover from the econo­
mic disruption of the Revolution. Ambassador Morrow walked into a 
conciliatory atmosphere.
At first, Jfexicans distrusted Morrow. The new Ambassador had
^^^Ellis, Kellogg, p. 47
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been associated with the J. P. Morgan Company for fourteen years prior 
to his appointment. Despite this background. Morrow took an impartial 
view of two of the most difficult problems facing the United States 
and Mexico-— oil and the Ctiurch. Under instructions fron President 
Coolidge to keep the United States out of war with Mexico, Morrow 
contributed greatly to that goal.^^^
In discussions with Calles, Morrow made the first significant 
break in the impasse over the oil question. Morrow gained Calles’ 
confidence and suggested, upon Calles’ request for Morrow’s opinion, 
that the best way to improve the situation would be for the Mexican 
Supreme Court to rule in favor of a 1921 decision against retroactive 
application of Article 27. Calles accepted the decision, and on Novem­
ber 17, 1927, the Supreme Court ruled that the December, 1925 law
195requiring fifty year leases was unconstitutional.
Oil companies were not satisfied. They were still subject to the 
provision requiring positive acts, and all lands became subject to 
expropriation for ’public utility. ’ Only complété guarantees for 
future operations were acceptable to the oilmen as many held oil lands 
that had not yet been exploited. President Calles introduced legisla­
tion giving the foreign owners or lessors preference should the Mexican 
government decide to allow development of those unexploited lands. 
Morrow and his banker friends urged the oilmen to accept the practical 
advantages of the Supreme Court decision and the January, 1928, 
legislation. From that point onward, the State Department took the
IS^Ellis, Kellogg, p. 47.
195Smith, Revolutionary Nationalism, p. 51-
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position that it would not act except in cases of specific injuries.
J. Reuben Clark, Jr., one of Morrow’s staff, accurately outlined the
new policy. He said nationalization of property was a sovereign
right and the conpanies would have to accept conditions which Mexico
196inposed upon them. For the time being oil companies had to accept 
Ifexico’s few concessions. The New York Times hailed it as the end to 
the oil problems. There wasnb significant break in the arrangement 
until 1938.
Ambassador Iferrow also intervened in Mexico's dispute with the 
Catholic Church and helped end the internal strife created by that 
particular disagreement. Iferrow saw the reasoning for both points 
of view and felt that negotiations could bring the Church and govern­
ment into an agreement. He met with both sides and drew than into 
conferences which ultimately led to a truce and end to the clerics’ 
strike in 1929.
One author has asserted that the conprcanise between the Church 
and State came about because many Mexicans viewed the Church as having 
a valuable role in Mexican nationalism. Concerning the dispute 
Walter Washington said, "no atheistic void" awaited "the arrival of a 
Communist faith." The Mexicans did not seek Ccmmunist replacements
for their striking c l e r i c s . ^99
l^^Eiiis, Kellogg, p. 55.
^97«rhe New York Times, March 28, 1928, p. 1.
^^^United States Department of State. Foreign Relations of tbe 
United States. 1928 (Washington. D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1943), 
pp. 325-335.
^^^S. Wlater Washington, "Mexican Resistance to Communism,"
FOifeign Affairs. XUSTL (April, 1958), p. 509.
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With two of Mexico *s most disruptive problems put into the back­
ground, Morrow settled down to less dramatic diplomatic practice. For 
the rest of his Mexican stay the former Morgan associate took up the 
challenge of Mexico’s economic problems. Morrow sought stability as a 
prerequisite to the Mexicans’ financial dilemma. In opposition to his 
old banker friends, the ambassador wanted American investors to delay 
temporarily demands for payments on confiscated lands as had been 
agreed under the Bucareli plans. Unsuccessful as he was in keeping 
those tho lost land from exerting pressure for compensation. Morrow 
did succeed in keeping the State Desprtrnent less hostile toward Mexico.
No crisis arose over the claims in the 1920’s.
The new era of stabilized diplomatic relations corresponded with 
the evaporation of State Department concern over alleged IVfexican 
Bolshevism. Although some elements of the United States public still 
claimed Mexico was a hotbed of Communism, the State Department did. not 
take an active concern. The number of notes relating to Bolshevism 
dwindled to occasional passing references from 1928 to 1930 in State 
Department correspondence with its ffexican representatives.
The State Department’s lack of interest in Mexican Bolshevism 
may have been related to an increasing Mexican government conflict 
with the irritating Communists. In 1928 a religious fanatic assassi­
nated President-elect Obregon. Outgoing President Calles than had- 
picked Emilio Portes Gil to serve until new elections could be held in 
1929. The Communists resented the strongtian tactics of President Calles, 
especially since Calles and his supporters took an increasingly
^^^Smith, Revolutionary Nationalism, pp. 260-262.
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conciliatory attitude toward the United States. A Comintem represen­
tative called Morrow * Morgan* s sleuth hound* and said the * settlement ’ 
of the oil question meant the United States had now embarked upon a
peaceful penetration policy in order to take control of the Mexican
201economy. The Communists therefore took a hostile attitude toward
the Mexican government.
In 1929 the Communists tarporarlly put aside their animosity
toward Calles and President Fortes Gil to aid the government in putting
down a revolt by General Escobar. Escobar had taken up arms when it
appeared his candidate, Gilberto Valenzuela, would not have a chance
in the 1929 election because of Calles* inposltion of Fascual Ortiz Rubio.
The Mexican Communist Party paid for arms and ammunition and gathered
a small force in Yucat^ which, helped defeat Escobar. Escobar*s alleged
reactionary support forced the Communists to side with the government.
202It was not a judicious decision as the Communists soon discovered.
Calles, in his position as Secretary of War, took canmand of govern­
ment forces. He not only crushed the Escobar rebellion with American aid, 
but also turned on the Comnunists vdio had organized against Escobar 
themselves. Communist leader José Guadalupe Rodriquez was executed for 
trying to form soviets of soldiers and peasants. The agrarian leagues 
under Ursulo Galvan backed away from the Comnunists and went over to 
C a l l e s . T h e  Comintem reacted with hostility to the Mexican govem-
^O^Intemational Press Correspondence, July 26, 1928. 
^°^Ibld., March 15, 1929.
^^^Alba, The Mexicans, p. 171.
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nfônt for its treacherous alliance with United States imperialists, but 
the Communist agency was harsh on the Mexican Ccmminists, too. Accor­
ding to the Comintem* s executive committee the PCM had not understood 
the nature of the conflict in Mexico. To those sitting in Moscow, it 
appeared the Mexican struggle was between imperialist factions and the 
Mexican Communists should have stayed out of the fight.
In July, 1929, the Executive Ccmnittee of the Communist Inter­
national issued a manifesto against the ’Fascist' Mexican government. 
Peasants received instructions to keep their arms and "take a vigorous 
stand against Mexican fascian." The Comintern told all of its member 
organizations to protest the Mexican government's alleged friendliness 
toward imperialist nations. Mexico's Ambassador in Moscow wrote a 
protest note suggesting that the Soviet government exert its control 
and silence criticism coming from the C o n l n t e m . S o v i e t  Foreign 
Minister Maxim Litvinov, Mille stressing his government's friendly
attitude toward the Mexican people, denied that the Soviet government
207had any control over the Comintem and, therefore, could not ccnply.
The Ifexicans themselves decided to act to quiet the Conmunists.
In Mexico City on the evening of August 29, police raided the Communists' 
newspaper, El Machete. The office was shut down, and four were arrested
*̂̂ ^International Press Correspondence, April 12, 1929*
^^^Jane Degras, ed.. Communist International 1919-1943 (3 vols.; 
London: Oxford University Press, 1956-1960), Üï, pp. 71-73-
^^^Dokumenty Vneshney PolitIki: SSR, xii (1929), no 329, p- 574,
in Clissold, Soviet Relatims, p. 92.
°̂̂ Ibid.
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including the editor, Gonzales Lorenzo.Shortly before the raid the 
Mexican goverranent ordered imigration officials to prevent all Communists
20Qof any nationality from entering Mexico.
The Conlntem directed more protests against persecution of Comnu­
nists in Mexico. United States affiliates of the International gathered 
before Mexican consulates to protest the arrest of comrades. Demonstra­
tors appeared in Washington and New York, and one gourp harangued Pre-
pi f)sident Ortiz Rubio in Detroit on a visit to Henry Ford.
Designed to obtain the end of harrassment of Communists by jfexican 
officials, the demonstrations backfired. When President Ortiz Rubio 
returned to Mexico, his Foreign Minister Genaro Estrada announced to the 
press that Mexico had severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union. The break came because of the insulting demonstrations which 
Ortiz Rubio said originated with directives from Moscow. The Mexican 
Foreign Minister indignantly denounced the Soviets for not displaying 
the same respect for sovereignty that Mexico had shown by recognizing 
the Soivet goverranent at a time when it was less than fashionable to 
do 80.211
With fervent anti-Communist campaign conducted by the Mexican 
government, the State Department appartently relaxed its fears. Friend-
2Q^The New York Times, August 31 > 1929, p. 5.
^°^Ibid., August 18, 1929, II, p. 21.
210Ibid., Jan. 24, 1930, pp. 1 and 21.
211ibid., p. 21. President Ortiz Rubio confiremd Estrada*s com­
ments in an appearance before the Mexican Congress. For excerpts from 
that speech see Clissold, Soviet Relations„ pp. 95-97-
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ly relations with Mexico could help protect United States Investments 
there. The State Department could not control, however, Individulas* 
attitudes towards IVfexlco and its leaders, and It was the attitude of 
one person that nearly disrupted friendly relations between the United 
States and Mexico in 1929. John A. Vails, District Attorney In Laredo, 
persued a plan to arrest Mexican ex-President Plutarco El^as Calles.
In December, 1928, Calles went to Europe via the United States.
The State Department then learned that John Vails, former District 
Attorney of Webb County, had stated that General Calles would be arres­
ted for an alleged part in the murder of General Lucio Blanco and a 
companion in Laredo on June 7, 1922. Acting Secretary of State Wilbur 
J. Carr sent a message to the Governor of Texas asking that any such 
attempt be stifled. Carr said that any action against General Calles
would be detrimental to the friendly relations between the Ignited States
212and Mexico.
Calles passed through Laredo to New York without serious incidents. 
There was a small honor guard to greet him along with a canmlttee from 
the Laredo Chamber of Commerce, and General Calles seemed quite pleased 
at the Reception.Referring to charges against General Calles, a 
manber of the Mexican Consulate In Laredo said that according to Inter­
national law, Vails could not bring suit against the General. He said 
Lucio Blanco and his conpanion were murdered on July 7» 1922. Calles 
could prove that he was in Mexico City on that day. He was therefore
^^R. G. 59, 812.001C13/37, Acting Secretary of State Wilbur J.
Carr to Governor of Texas Dan Moody, July 1, 1929.
G. 59, 812.001C13/4i , Richard Boyce (Am. Consul) to Secretary 
of State, July 23, 1929.
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outside the Jurisdiction of the State of Texas. The Consular official
further pointed out that at the time of his death Blanco was in open
Ürebellion against the government of Mexico.
Secretary of State Stimson studied the legal aspects of the accu­
sations against Calles. According to material available there was no 
basis for Vails to arrest Calles. If Calles were to be tried for Blanco*s 
death, it would be Mexico’s responsibility to prosecute. Stimson said 
this would be unreasonable since Blanco and his companion, Avralio Mar­
tinez, were in open revolt against the Obregon regime in vtoich Calles 
served as a cabinet matber.
Upon the eve of General Calles ’ return to the United States and 
Mexico in December, 1929, events did not bode well for him if he re­
turned through Laredo as had been planned. In November the State De­
partment was rudely awakened to the fact that Calles ’ arch enemy John 
A. Vails had returned to the post of Prosecuting Attorney of Webb 
County. When approached by an American Consulate official, Vails said 
that he still intended to arrest Calles should he ever enter Texas.
He also claimed that only official recognition of Calles’ diplomatic 
immunity by the President of the United States would dissuade him from 
making the arrest. To attest to Vails’ determination, Roy Canpbell,
G. 59, 812.001C13/57, Sec. of State Stimson to Am. Consul of 
Laredo, Dec. 3, 1929.
G. 59, 812.OOICI3/51, Roy Canpbell (Custcans Collector at 
laredo) to Ambassador Morrow, Nov. 13, 1929.
^^^R. G. 59, 812.OOICI3/52, Consul Boyce of Laredo to Sec. of 
State, Nov. 28, 1929.
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United States Customs Collector, told Ambassador Dwight Morrow that 
Vails was relentless and despised "everything and everybody in Mexico" 
except adherents of Porfirio Canpbell's analysis could be
confirroed by looking back to testimony Vails had given to the Fall Com­
mittee in 1920.
The American Consul at Nuevo Laredo, on December M, 1929, noted 
further evidence that Vails was going to attempt to arrest Calles for 
questioning in the Blanco killing. According to a Ccnsular report, 
Vails intended to break in the door of Calles' train to arrest him. If 
necessary he would also wire warrants for Calles' arrest to other parts 
of Texas. The report stated, furthermore. Attorney Vails did not care
PI Ahow much he mi^t embarass the United States Government. The so-
called political boss of Vails' district tried to dissuade him. So did
other prominent citizens. Vails remained obstinant.
Secretary of State Stimson, determined to prevent any possible
embarrassment by Attorney Vails, wrote to the latter informing him
that General Calles would have diplomatic status and the United States
220Government would take the necessary steps to prevent his arrest.
Vails made no reply other than to ask for clarification of what Calles' 
diplomatic status meant. The Consul at Nuevo Laredo said an exchange
217R. G. 59.812.OOICI3/51, Roy Canpbell (Customs Collector at 
Laredo) to Ambassador Morrow, Nov. 13, 1929. 
p"l8R. G. 59, 812.OOICI3/77, Consul Boyce to Sec. of State, Dec. 4,
1929.
G. 59, 812.OOICI3/7O, Consul at Nuevo Laredo to Sec. of State, 
Dec. 5, 1929.
PPOR. G. 59, 812.OCICI3/86, Stimson to Vails, Dec. 15, 1929.
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of letters with Vails disclosed that the latter would not recognize 
Calles' diplomatic inrnmlty. When the Consul asked Vails what he in­
tended to do if the United States provided protection, Vails replied 
that he would be prepared to meet such an occassion.^^^
On Deconber 14, 1929, J. P. Cotton, Undersecretary of State, sent 
a message to the War Department. He instructed the Secretary of War to 
make Wiatever arrangements were necessary to provide for General Calles* 
safety in Texas. He was to prevent John Vails form molesting the Mexi­
can ex-President in any way. In response, a "Guard of Honor" boarded 
Calles' train at Texarkana, Texas early on the morning of December 16. 
This small squad from the Eighth Anny Corps was to protect Calles vrtille 
passing through Laredo. At the International Bridge two private cars 
held another squad that would assist the first in case of an incident. 
They were supplementary to numerous special police agents from the 
railroad Wio were instructed to get Calles* train across the border.
On the evening of December l6, 1929, the train carrying General
Calles crossed the International Bridge without incident. Very few
pollpeople saw the armed g u a r d , a n d  the only result of the threat was 
that the Mexican Consulate in Laredo closed as a reprisal. It was a 
reprisal, not against the United States Government, but against those
021R. G. 59, 812.001C13/97, Boyce to Sec. of State, Dec. 13, 1929.
G. 59 , 812.001C13/100, J. P. Cotton to Sec. of War, Dec. l4,
1929.
223R. G. 59, 812.001C13/101, Hdg. Eighth Anry Corps to Commanding
General, Dec. 17, 1929.
^̂ Îbid.
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lAo had sought to embarrass General Calles.
The exchange of telegrams between Attorney John Vails and Secretary
of State Stimson on December 15, the day before Galles' arrival provided
the clue to the significance of Vails’ relationship to Bolshevism and
the 'Red Scare. ' Stimson said that Calles was traveling with the Mexican
Ambassador to the United States and his diplomatic status was recognized.
As a personal note he added that he could not understand why any law
officer might wish to act against Calles' diplomatic status.
John Vails made a rather brief but enlightening reply:
I thank you for your telegram of today exceptlrg that 
part of It expressing astonlshmait at my contenplated action 
to arrest Calles
A government that has given diplomatic Inraunlty to a 
fugitive from justice and thrown Its protecting arms around 
the greatest exponent of Bolshevism In the Western Hemisphere 
should express no surprise at the honest efforts of patriotic 
officials to fearlessly enforce the laws of Texas. %  Govern­
ment's conduct in this particular only postpones the day of 
reckoning when Calles will be brou^t to the bar of public 
justice to face.a courageous judge and an Incorruptible jury 
In Webb County.^27
How much Influence prejudice may have had on Vails Is disputable.
%  his telegram to Stimson, however, he gave the Impression that 
Calles* guilt as a Comnunlst matched any guilt he may have had 
the killing of General Blanco. Even If Vails' justification was the 
Blanco affair. It Is certain his attitude toward Calles and Mexican 
Communism added to his determination.
225r. g. 59, 812.OOICI3/92, Consul Boyce to Sec. of State, Dec. 17,
1929.
22&R, G. 59, 812.001013/86, Sec. of State Stimson to John Vails, 
Dec. 15, 1929.
G. 59, 812.OOICI3/81, John Vails to Stimson, Dec. 15, 1929.
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There was really more danger in the incident than anbarrassment 
to the United States govemnent. The Consul at Nuevo laredo had 
warned Vails that an arrest rnî it lead to a break in diplomatic rela­
tions between the two countries. Under these circumstances. United 
States citizens in Mexico might be subjected to hostile treatment. An 
arrest also would have undermined the better relations the United States 
sought at the time. There was even the chance that violent revolution 
might break out again in Mexico. Vails rejected his government's 
reasoning, legal precedence, and pleas from his friends to attempt
a policy based on his own fears and prejudices toward a man he considered
228to be the leading Communist in the Americas.
Ironically, Calles on returning to Mexico, took a stqp away 
from the radicalism associated with Conmunism. He initiated an agra­
rian program based upon effecient production rather than rapid land 
distribution. There were times in the past vhen Calles had appeared 
to eaiibody radicalism. He had been pragmatic in his approach to Mexi­
can nationalism as directed by the Revolution of 1910. He had, how-
229ever, never embraced international Comnunism.
The Texas official's attempt to arrest ex-President Calles under­
scores the trend in Mexican-United States relations in 1929. Attorney 
Vails represented a decreasing faction disgusted with the Mexican 
Revolution and quick to attribute the excesses of that movement to 
Ccnfmunist-insplred agitators. Ry the late 1920's, however, Americans
ppQR. G. 59, 812.OOICI3/7O, Consul at Nuevo Laredo to Sec. of 
State, Dec. 5, 1929.
^^^Alba, The Mexicans, p. 166.
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were less easily aroused by such allegations. The State Department 
recognized that trend, especially when Secretary Kellogg failed to 
gather popular support with charges against Mexican Conmunlsm In the 
Nicaragua affair In early 1927. The Department did not respond to 
Vails’ charge that Calles was the leading Bolshevik In the Western 
Hemisphere. Instead, Secretary Stimson claimed there was no legal 
reason to arrest the Mexican ex-President. ^y ordering the War 
Department to protect Calles, Stimson showed the length to which the 
government would go In order to Insure that nothing would Interrupt 
the friendlier ties between Mexico and the United States. Diplomacy 
by negotiation and conciliation appeared to work where threats had 
failed. The United States had learned that the Mexican revolutionary 
government meant an assertion of Mexican sovereignty.
Mexicans demanded respect for their sovereign rights from all 
foreigners. When the Ccmnunlsts continued agitating, the Mexican 
goverrment struck back under the legal Justification of Article 33 of 
the 1917 Constitution which prohibited foreigners from meddling In 
Mexican political affairs and gave the President power to expel those 
foreigners without Judicial p r o c e s s . I n  1930 the Mexican President 
kicked out the Soviets for Interferrlng In Mexican politics.
The New York Times sumned up the significance of that break In 
Mexican-Soviet diplomatic relations. The newspaper called It the 
end of an era. Morrow received most of the credit as the paper reported 
the following:
^^^Fall Conmlttee, p. 3130.
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The end of tha.t disturbed diplanatic period when there 
was bitter controversy over the oil and land laws and suspicions 
of Bolshevist manoeuvres agsdtnst the United States throu^
Mexico, caræ with the Mission of Dwight ¥, Morrow as Ambas­
sador to Mexico, but the sharp swing that Mexico City has now 
taken away from Moscow Is a source of gratification here and 
Is regarded as one more Indication of community of Interests 
between Mexico and the United States.231
The article pointed to the contrast of the situation In:1930 and 
the period three years prior when Secretary of State Kellogg called 
Mexico the center for Bolshevism In Latin America during the conflict 
over Nicaragua. Although Mexico consistently denied those accusations 
of Bolshevism, it was not until Ambassador Morrow went to Mexico that 
Americans ended their suspicions of the Mexican government In that 
regard. There was no official United States canment on the termination 
of Mexican-Soviet diplomatic relations, but there would be no reason 
to doubt the reporter’s Interpretation of a ’grateful’ W a s h i n g t o n . ^32 
It was indeed the end of an era.
^^^ e  New York Times. Jan. 25, 1930, p. 3-
232pbld.
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCUBIWS
Ccranunism left an Indelible imprint on Mexico’s affairs with her 
northern neighbor in the 1920’s. Cries of Bolshevism frequently emana­
ted from the North and distui’bed the nationalistic Mexicans vftio were 
cau#it up in a revolution intended to produce social, economic, and 
political reform. The goals of that revolution, summed up in the 1917 
IfexLcan Constitution, were similar enough to Communist designs in 
Russia so that many in the United States saw the Mexican situation as 
part of a Soviet-'-based international attack on American values and 
economic interests.
Mexico consistently defended her movement as an indigenous one and 
strove to obtain international respect for her sovereign rights. Ameri­
can businessmen may have lost capital and influence in Mexico during the 
1920’s, but the Communists, with their lack of respect for nationalism 
In the period, fared even worse.
The Conmunists never obtained much stren^h in Mexico. Michael Bo­
rodin, the first Comintem agent in Latin America, met Carranza, and the 
Mexican Conmunist Party received a grant from De la Huerta vÆiile he was 
finance minister for Obregon. Those two instances reveal the highest 
success achieved by the Communists in their attarpt to influence the 
Mexican revolutionary government. Communists also constantly confronted 
problems in trying to organize labor. I%xlcan workers passed resolutions
99
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rejecting directives rrcm Moscow and often disowned Connunist members 
within organizational ranks. Late in the 1920*s when the Ccmintem or­
dered active resistance to the Mexican govermænt, the Communist uprising 
was insignificant and quickly crushed.
Unsuccessful as the Communists may have been in the 1920's, there 
remained some potential for take-over. Lazaro Cardenas, President 
during the 1930's and noted for his radical application of Article 27 
vfliile his country's leader, openly sided with the Communists after he 
left office. Hie realities of Mexico's strongman government could 
have meant Communist control had Cardenas converted while still in 
the Presidency. As long as JVtexican politics remained under domina­
tion by an elite, the Communists had an opportunity to obtain power 
should they persuade a meiriber of that elite to accept Communist 
ideology.
Communist failure in Mexico did little to avert hostile opinion 
in some segments of the United States citizenry. The mere appearance 
of a Communist pamphlet or small demonstration provided sufficient 
evidence to convince some that the Mexican government adhered to an 
international conspiracy against the capitalist system. First among 
accusations of Mexican Bolshevism were those that emanated from the 
Fall Committee. They came mostly from men with economic interests 
in Mexico and included Chairman Albert Fall himself, who was not 
beyond looking after his own interests as was evidenced in the 
Teapot Dome oil lease scandal in 1923. Edward Doheny, one of the 
oil raagnated involved in that scandas, was another who appeared 
before the committee to denounce Comnunism in Mexico. Both Fall and
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Doheny had money Invested in Mexican property. Certainly their 
convictions regarding rampant radicalism In Mexico had something to 
do with their own potential losses.
In late 1926 and early 1927 State Department officials took up 
the charge of Mexican Cannunlam. They hoped to gain support for unpo­
pular intervention In Nicaragua by accusing the Mexicans of trying to 
establish a Ccninunlst regime In the Central American republic. The 
response was Imnedlate and negative. Présidait Calles indignantly 
rejected the charge and Mexican newspapers defended Calles* position. 
United States Senators created the most active opposition to the 
charge of Mexican Bolshevism, and the affair died down after Secretary 
Stimson*s successful negotiating tour In Nicaragua. Mexico and the 
IMlted States had reached a peak of tension that brought on fear of 
impending war. Neither country desired that extreme and attitudes 
seemed to change after that confrontation.
When Attorney Vails tried to arrest ex-Presldent Calles he ran 
into stiff resistance from the State Department. Although the Depart­
ment had recorded numerous charges against Calles as a Bolshevik, 
it preferred to keep up the new air of friendly relations that made 
negotiation over claims so much simpler. Arresting the former Mexican 
President would have thrown Mexico Into new tuimoll since Calles 
remained the power behind the Presidency. A new outbreak of violence 
very likely would have endangered American lives and property. State 
Department officials were not about to risk losing their new influence, 
^Ined largely through Ambassador Morrow’s efforts.
Attorney Vails* criticism of Calles as the leading Bolshevik in
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the Western Hemisphere seemed more like a remnant of an earlier time 
when Americans anxiously shipped out anyone suspected of synpathlzing 
with the Conmunist cause, and arrest notices constantly filled the front 
pages of the nation’s newspapers. Qy the late 1920*s the scare had sub­
dued to such an extent that the charge of Bolshevism would have fallen 
on many deaf or irritated ears. It was not sufficient to arouse popu­
lar support in 1927 when the Secretary of State tried to use it to jus­
tify intervention in Nicaragua. There was less chance it could bring 
support for a possible direct confrontation with Mexico in 1929 > and 
that charge was the only one available against ex-President Calles 
since State Department lawyers declared there was no legal way to 
try Calles for implication in the Blanco murder. Since Mexico at that 
time was involved in an open break with the Soviets and actively 
prosecuting Conmunist agents, it would have been difficult to present 
a convincing claim that the Mexicans had gone Ccninunlst.
Throughout the 1920’s, then, Ccranunism had a definite inpact on 
Mexican-United States relations. It is not within the scope of this 
study to suggest United States acticais regarding alleged Mexican Bolshe­
vism were either right or wrong. It is true that most of those charges 
came from persons with special interests in Mexico and therefore, with 
possible alternate motivations for desiring a direct confrontation 
with the Mexican revolutionary goverrment. Ihat the Mexicans did apply 
pressure on the Coninunists does not necessalrily inply that they did 
so because of those harsh allegaticns emanating from the United 
States. JMore likely, the nationalist fervor in Mexico defeated the 
Communist and their international plan. By the end of the decade the
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United States government came much closer to understanding Mexico’s 
national goals and the possibilities of negotiating differences without 
threat and, as It appeared to the Mexicans, without the derogatory 
charge that the Mexican government adhered to an International Ccanmi- 
nlst Ideology.
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APPENDIX A
ARTICIE TIÆMY-SEVEN OP IHE 
MEXICAN CONSTITOTION OF 1917
The ownership of lands and waters comprised within the limits of 
the national territory is vested originally in the Nation, which has had, 
and has, the right to transmit title thereof to private persons, thereby 
constituting private property.
Private property shall not be expropriated except for reasons of 
public utility and by means of indemnification.
Ihe nation shall have at all times the right to inpose on private 
property such limitations as the public interest may demand as well as 
the right to regulate the development of natural resources, which are 
susceptible of appropriation, in order to conserve them and equitably to 
distribute the public wealth. For this purpose necessary measures shall 
be taken to divide large landed estates; to develop small landed hold- 
to establish new centers of rural population with such lands and 
waters as may be indispensable to them; to encourage agriculture and to 
prevent the destruction of natural resources, and to protect property 
fran damage detrimental to society. Settlonents, hamlets situated on 
private property and communes which lack lands or water do not possess 
them in sufficient quantities for their needs shall have the right to 
be provided with them from the adjoining properties, always having due 
regard for small landed holdings. Wherefore, all grants of lands made
105
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up to the present time under the decree of January 6, 1915, are confir­
med. Private property acquired for the said purposes shall be consi­
dered as taken for public utility.
In the Nation is vested direct ownership of all minerals or sub­
stances vdiich in veins, layers, masses or beds constitute deposits 
vAose nature is different from the components of the land, such as miner­
als from Tidiich metals and metaloids used for industrial purposes are 
extracted; beds of precious stones, rock salt and salt lakes fanned 
directly by marine waters, products derived from the decanposition of 
rocks, vdnen their exploitation requires underground work; phosphates 
which may be used for fertilizers; solid mineral fuels; petroleum and 
all hydrocarbons— solid, liquid or gaseous.
In the Nation is likewise vested the ownership of the water of 
territorial seas to the extent and in the terms fixed by the law of the 
nation; those of lakes and inlets of bays; those of interior lakes of 
natural formation thich are directly connected with flowing waters; 
those of prinicpal rivers or tributaries from the points at which there 
is a permanent current of water in their beds to their mouths, whether 
they flow to the sea or cross two or more states; those of intermittent 
streams vdiich traverse two or more States in their main boc^; the waters 
of rivers, streams or ravines, when they bound the national territory 
or that of the States; waters extracted from mines; and the beds and 
banks of the lakes and streams hereinbefore mentioned, to the extent 
fixed by law. Any other stream of water not comprised within the fore­
going enumeration shall be considered as an integral part of the private 
porperty through vdiich it flows; but the development of the waters when
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they pass from one landed property to another shall be considered of 
public utility and shall be subject to the provisions prescribed by the 
States.
In the cases to which the two foregoing paragraphs refer, the owner­
ship of the Nation is inalienable and may not be lost by prescription; 
concessions shall be granted by the Federal Government to private parties 
or civil or carmercial corporations organized under the laws of Mexico, 
only on condition that said resources be regularly developed, and on the 
further condition that legal provisions be observed.
Le^l capacity to acquire ownership of lands and waters of the 
nation shall be governed by the following provisions;
I. Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican caipanies 
have the right to acquire ownership of lands, waters and their appur­
tenances, or to obtain concessions to develop mines, waters or mineral 
fuels in the Republic of ffexico. The Nation may grant the same ri^t to 
foreigners, provided they agree before the Department of Foreign Affairs 
to be considered Mexicans in respect to such property, and accordingly 
not to invoke the protection of their Goverrments in respect to the same, 
under penalty. In case of breach, of forfeiture to the Nation of property 
so acquired. Within a zone of 100 kilcroeters from the frontiers, and
50 kilometers from the sea coast, no foreigner shall under any conditions 
acquire direct ownership of lands and waters.
II. The religious institutions known as churches, irrespective 
of creed, shall in no case have legal capacity to acquire, hold or ad­
minister real property or loans made of such real property; all such 
real property or loans as may be at present be held by the said reli-
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glous Institutions, either on their own behalf or through third parties, 
shall vest In the Nation, and any one shall have the right to denounce 
property so held. Presunptlve proof shall be sufficient to declare the 
denunciation well-founded. Places of public worship are the property 
of the Nation, as represented by the Federal Government, which shall 
determine vdilch of them may continue to be devoted to their present pur­
poses. Episcopal residences, rectories, seminaries, orphan asylums or 
collegiate establishments of religious Institutions, convents or any 
other bulldir^s built or designed for the administration, propaganda or 
teaching of the tenets of any religious creed shall forthwith vest, as 
of full right, directly in the Nation, to be used exclusively for the 
public services of the Federation or of the States, within their 
respective jurisdictions. All places of public worship which shall 
later be erected shall be the property of the Nation.
II. Public and private charitable institutions for the sick and 
needy, for scientific research, or for the diffusion of knowledge, 
mutual aid societies or organizations formed for any other lawful pur­
pose shall in no case acquire, hold or administer loans made on real 
prcperty, unless the mortgage terms do not exceed ten years. In no case 
shall institutions of this character be under the patronage, direction, 
administration, charge or supervision of religious corporations or insti­
tutions, nor of ministers of any religious creed or of their dependents, 
even thou^ either the former or the latter shall not be in active 
service.
IV. Commercial stock companies shall not acquire, hold or admi­
nister rural properties. Companies of this nature which may be organi
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zed to develop any manufacturing, mining, petroleum, or other industry, 
excepting only agricultural industries, may acquire, hold or administer 
lands only in an area absolutely necessary for their establishments or 
adequate to serve the purposes indicated, vrtiich the Executive of the 
Union or of the respective State in each case shall determine.
V. Banks duly organized under the laws governing institutions of 
credit may make mortgage loans on rural and urban property in accordance 
with the provisions of the said laws, but they may not own nor administer 
more real property than that absolutely necessary for their direct pu2~- 
poses; and they may furthermore hold tarporarlly for the brief term 
fixed by law such real property as may be judicially adjudicated to 
them In execution proceedings.
VI. Properties held in common by co-owners, hamlets situated on 
private property, pueblos, tribal congregations and other settlaments 
which, as a matter of fact or law, conserve their communal character, 
shall have legal capacity to enjoy in common the waters, woods and lands 
belonging to them, or which may have been or shall be restored to them 
according to the law of January 6, 1915, until such time as the manner 
of making the division of the lands shall be determined by law.
VII. Excepting the corporations to which Paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 
and 13 here refer, no other civil corporation may hold or administer 
on its own behalf real estate or mortgage loans derived therefrom, with 
the single exception of buildings designed directly and irrmediately for 
the purposes of the institution. The States, the Federal District and 
the Territories, as well as the municipalities throughout the Republic, 
shall enjoy full legal capacity to acquire and hold all real estate
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necessary for public services.
The Federal and State laws shall determine within their respective 
jurisdictions those cases in which the occupation of private property 
shall he considered of piÆlic utility; and in accordance with the said 
laws the administrative authorities shall make the corresponding de­
claration. The amount fixed as compensation for the expropriated pro­
perty shall be based on the sum at which the said property shall be 
valued for fiscal purposes in the catastral or revenue offices, whether 
this value be that manifested by the owner or merely inpliedly accepted 
by reason of the payment of his taxes on such a basis, to which there 
^hall be added 10 per cent. The increased value which the property in 
question may have acquired through inprovonents made subsequent to the 
date of the fixing of the fiscal value shall be the only matter subject 
to expert opinion and to judicial determination. The same procedure 
shall be observed in respect to objects whose value is not recorded In 
the revenue offices.
All proceedings, findings, decisions and all operations of demar­
cation, concession, composition, judgnent, compromise, alienation or 
auction which may have deprived properties held in common by co-owners, 
hamlets situated on private property, settlements, congregations, 
tribes and other settlement organizations still existing since the law 
of June 25, 1856, of the whole or a part of their lands, woods and 
waters, are declared mull and void; all findings, resolutions and opera­
tions which may subsequently take place and produce the same effects 
shall likewise be null and void. Consequently all lands, forests and 
waters of which the above-mentioned settlanents may have been deprived
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shall be restored to them according to the decree of January 6, 1915, 
vfliich shall remain in force as a constitutional law. In case the adju­
dication has been requested by any of the above entities, those lands 
shall nevertheless be given to them by way of grant, and they shall in 
no event fail to receive such as they may need. Only such lands title 
to vàiichmay have been acquired in the divisions made by virtue of the 
said law of June 25, I856, or such as ma^ be held In undisputed owner­
ship for more than ten years are excepted form the provision of nullity, 
provided their area does not exceed fifty hectareas. Any excess over 
this area shall be returned to the comnune and the owner shall be indem­
nified. All laws of restitution enacted by virtue of this provision 
shall be lirmediately carried into effect by the administrative authori­
ties . Only members of the ccmmune shall have the right to the lands 
destined to be divided, and the rights to these lands shall be inalienable 
so long as they remain undivided; the same provision shall govern the 
ri^t of ownership after the division has been made. The exercise of 
the rl^its pertaining to the Naticn by virtue of this article shall 
follow judicial process; but as a part of this process and by order of 
the proper tribunals, which order shsill be issued within the maximum 
period of one month, the administrative authorities shall proceed with­
out delay to the occupation, administration, auction or sale of the 
lands and waters in question, together with all their appurtenances, 
and in no case may the acts of the said authorities be set aside until 
final sentence is handed down.
During the next constitutional teim, the Congress and the State 
Legislatures shall encat laws, within their respective jurisdictions.
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for the purpose of carrying out the division of large landed estates, 
subject to the following conditions:
(a) In each State and Territory there shall be fixed the maximum 
area of land which any one individual or legally organized corporation 
may own.
(b) Tte excess of the area thus fixed shall be subdivided by the 
owner within the period set by the laws of the respective locality; and 
these subdivisions shall be offered for sale on such conditions as the 
respective governments shall ^prove, in accordance with the said laws.
(c) If the owner shall refuse to make the subdivision, this shall 
be carried out by the local government, by means of eaq^ropriation 
proceedings.
(d) Ihe value of the subdivisions shall be paid in annual amounts 
sufficient to amortize the principal and interest within a period of 
not less than twenty years, during which the person acquiring them may 
not alienate them. The rate of interest shall not exceed 5 per cent 
per annum.
(e) The owner shall be bound to receive bonds of a special issue 
to guarantee the payment of the property expropriated. With this end in 
view, the Congress shall issue a law authorizing the States to issue 
bonds to meet their agrarian obligations.
(f) The local laws shall govern the extent of the family patrimony, 
and determine what property shall constitute the same on the basis of 
its inalienability; it shall not be subject to attachment nor to any 
charge whatever.
All contract and concessions made by former Governments fran and
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after the year I876 which shall have resulted in the monopoly of lands, 
waters and natural resources of the Nation by a single individual or 
corporation, are declared subject to revision, and the Executive is 
authorized to declare those null and void which seriously prejudice 
the public interest.
Source: Foreign Relations. 1917. pp. 955-957.
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APEENDIX B
AKETCIE ONE HUNDRED TWENTÏ-THREE 
OP THE MEXICAN CONSTITUTION OP 1917
The Congress and the State Legislatures shall make laws relative 
to labor with due regard for the needs of each region of the Republic, 
and in confomlty with the following principles, and these principles 
and laws shall govern the labor of skilled and unskilled workmen, em­
ployees, domestic servants and artisans, and in general every contract 
of labor.
I. Eight hours shall be the maximum limit of a day's work.
II. The maximum limit of night work shall be seven hours. Un­
healthy and dangerous occupations are forbidden to all women and to 
children under sixteen years of age. Night work in factories is likwise 
forbidden to women and to children under sixteen years of age; nor shall 
they be employed in commercial establishments after ten o’clock at night.
III. The maximum limit of a day’s work for children over twelve 
and under sixteen years of age shall be six hours. The work of children 
under twelve years of age shall not be made the subject of a contract.
IV. Every workman shall enjoy at least one day’s rest for every 
six days’ work.
V. Women shall not perform any physical work requiring consider­
able physical effort during the three months Immediately preceding a 
parturition; during the month following parturition they shall neces-
114
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sarlly enjoy a period of rest and shall receive their salaries or wages 
in full and retain their enployment and the ri^ts they may have ac­
quired under their contracts. During the period of lactation they shall 
enjoy two extraordinary daily periods of rest of one-half hour each, in 
order to nurse their children.
VI. The minimum wage to be received by a workman shall be that 
considered sufficient, according to the conditions prevailing in the 
respective region of the country, to satisfy the normal needs of the life 
of the workman, his education and his lawful pleasures, considering
him as the head of the family. In all agricultural, canraercisil, manu­
facturing or mining enterprises the workmen shall have the right to 
participate in the profits in the manner fixed in Clause IX of this 
article.
VII. The same compensation shall be paid for the same work, withr* 
out regard to sex or nationality.
VIII. The minimum wage shall be exenpt from attachment, set-off 
or discount.
IX. The determination of the minimum wage and of the rate of 
profit-sharing described in Clause VI shall be made by special commis­
sions to be appointed in each municipality and to be subordinated to the
■> Central Board of Conciliation to be established in each state.
X. All wages shall be paid in legal currency and shall not be paid 
in merchandise, orders, counters or ary other representative token with 
which it is sought to substitute money.
XI. When owing to special circumstances it becomes necessary to 
increase the working hours, there shall be paid as wages for the over-
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tiem one hundred percent more than those fixed for regular time. In no 
case shall the overtime exceed three hours nor continue for more than 
three consecutive days; and no women of vdiatever age nor boys under sijc- 
teen years of age may engage in overtime work.
XII. In every agricultural, industrial, mining or other class of 
work etrployers are bound to furnish their workmen confortable and 
sanitray dwelling-places, for which they may charge rents not exceeding 
one-half of one per cent per month of the assessed value of the proper­
ties. They shall likewise establish schools, dispensaries and other 
services necessary to the ccranunity. If the factories are located 
within inhabited places and more than one hundred persons are employed 
therein, the first of the above-mentioned conditions shall be conplied 
with.
XIII. Furthermore, there shall be set aside in these labor centers, 
vftienever their population exceeds two hundred inhabitants, a space of 
land not less than five thousand square meters for the establishment of 
public markets, and the construction of buildings designed for muni­
cipal services and places of amusement. No saloons nor gambling houses 
shall be permitted in such labor centers.
XIV. Employers shall be liable for labor accidents and occupa­
tional diseases arising from work; therefore, arployers shall pay the 
proper indemnity, according to vftiether death or merely temporary or 
permanent disability has ensued, in accordance with the provisions of 
law. This liability shall reamin in force even thou^the employer 
contract for the work through an agent.
XV. Employers shall be bound to observe in the installation of
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their establishments all the provisions of law regarding hygiene and 
sanitation and to adopt adequate measures to prevent accidents due 
to the use of machinery, tools and working materials, as well as to or­
ganize work in such a manner as to assure the greatest guaranties pos­
sible for the health and lives of workmen caipatible with the nature of 
the work, under penalties which the law shall determine.
XVI. Workmen and «iployers shall have the right to unite for the 
defense of their respective interests, by forming syndicates, unions, etc,
JCVII. The law shall recognize the rigjht of workmen and employers 
to strike and to lockout.
XVIII. Strikes shall be lawful when by the employment of peaceful 
means they shall aim to bring about a balance between the various fac­
tors of production, and to harmonize the rigjtits of capital and labor.
In the case of public services, the workmen shall be obliged to give 
notice ten days in advance to the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration 
of the date set for the suspension of work. Strikes shall only be 
considered unlawful vûnen the majority of the strikers shall resort to 
acts of violence against persons or property, or in case of war Wien 
the strikers belong to establishment and services dependent on the gov­
ernment shall not be included in the provisions of this clause. Inasmuch 
as they are a dependency of the national army.
XIX. Lockouts shall only be lawful When the excess of production 
shall render it necessary to shut down In order to maintain prices 
reasonably above the cost of production, subject to the apporval of the 
Board of Conciliation and Arbitration.
XX. Differences or disputes between capital and labor shall be
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submitted for settlement to a board of conciliation and ait)itration to 
consist of an equal number of representatives of workmen and of the ent- 
ployers and of one representative of the Government.
XXI. If the enployer shall refuse to submit his differences to 
arbitration or to accept the award rendered by the Board, the labor con­
tract shall be considered as terminated, and the erployer shall be bound 
to indemnify the workman by the payment to him of three months’ wages, 
in addition to the liability, which he may have incurred by reason of 
the dispute. If the workman reject the award, the contract will be 
held to have terminated.
XXII. An employer who discharges a workman without proper cause or 
for having Joined a union or syndicate or for having taken part in a 
lawful strike shall be bound, at the option of the workman, either to 
perform the contract or to indemnify him by the payment of three months' 
wages. He shall incur the same liability if the workman shall leave 
his service on account of the lack of good faith on the part of the 
employer or of maltreatment either as to his own person or that of his 
wife, parents, children or brothers or sisters. The employer cannot 
evade this liability when the maltreatment is inflicted by subordi­
nates or agents acting with his consent or knowledge.
XXIII. Claims of workmen for salaries or wages accrued during the 
past year and other indemnity claims shall be preferred over any other 
claims, in cases of bankruptcy or composition.
XXIV. Debts contracted by workmen in favor of their employers or 
their enployers* associates, subordinates or agents, may only be charged 
against the workmen thonselves and in no case and for no reason collected
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frcan the members of his family. Nor shall such, debts be paid by the 
taking of more than the entire wages of the workman for any one month.
XXV. No fee shall be charged for finding work for workmen by 
municipal offices, enployment bureaus or other public or private agencies.
XXVI. Every contract of labor between a Jfexlcan citizen and a 
foreign principal shall be legalized before the conpetent municipal 
authority and viseed by the consul of the nation to which the workman 
is undertaking to go, on the understanding that, in addition to the 
usual clauses, special and clear provisions shall be Inserted for the 
payment by the foreign principal making the contract of the cost to 
the laborer of repatriation.
XXVII. The following stipulations shall be null and void and shall 
not bind the contracting parties, even though embodied in the contract:
(a) Stipulations providing for inhuman day's work an account of 
its notorious excessiveness, in view of the nature of the work.
(b) Stipulations providing for a wage rate which in the judgment 
of the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration is not remunerative.
(c) Stipulations providing for a term of more than one week before 
the payment of wages.
Cd) Stipulations providing for the assigning of places of amuse­
ment, eating places, cafes, taverns, saloons or shops for the payment of 
wages, when employees of such establishments are not involved.
(e) Stipulations involving a direct or indirect obligation to 
purchase articles of consumption in specified shops or places.
(f) Stipulations permitting the retention of wages by way of fines.
Cg) Stipulations constituting a waiver on the part of the workman
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of the indemnities to vÆiich he may become entitled by reason of labor 
accidents or occupational diseases, damages for breach of contract, or 
for discharge from work.
(h) All other stipulations inplying the waiver of any ri^t 
vested in the workman by labor laws.
XXVIII. îhe law shall decide what property constitutes the family 
patrimony. These goods shall be inalienable and shall not be mortgaged, 
nor attached, and may be bequeathed with simplified formalities in the 
succession proceedings.
XXIX. Institutions of popular insurance established for old age, 
sickness, life, unemployment, accident and others of a similar charac­
ter, are considered of social utility; the Federal and State Governments 
shall therefore encourage the organization of institutions of this 
character in order to instill and inculcate popular habits of thrift.
XXX. Cooperative associations for the construction of cheap and 
sanitary dwelling houses for workmen shall likewise be considered of 
social utility whenever these properties are designed to be acquired 
in ownership by the workmen within specified periods.
Source: Foreign Relations, 1917. pp. 986-987.
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